To : CG, 1st Bomb Wing, Att.; A-2

Marretive.

1. Twenty one (21) A/C of the 306th Ecob Group (H) were airborne at 0930 hours to attack the primary target, submarine sheds at Wilhelmshaven. Of these, seventeen (17) A/C bembed the primary while four (4) returned early due to mechanical difficulties, and 3 A/C failed to return. The route flown was approximately twenty (20) miles to the right of the I.P. Clouds were encountered and reports of icing conditions above 20,000 feet were submitted. Visibility over the target was hazy but moderately good.

- 2. Indeterminate but probably poor, because of evasive action produced by fierce ground and aerial opposition, also an effective smoke screen over the target area. Bombs were dropped but their lodgment was not followed due to enemy fighter action.
- 3. 1 turned back at 1155 hours, 175 miles off English coast. Could not keep formation because of clouds.

1 turned back at 1022 near English coast because of engine failure.

1 turned back at 1035 near English coast because of engine failure.

1 turned back 160 miles from English coast due to losing formation.

4. Approximately 100 E/A, chiefly Fw 190's, He 109's and Ju 88's were reported. Many direct attacks were reported, in a determined manner. Nost attacks were directed from nose and tail. Guns, firing single shells, were reported as carried under wings of E/A. Aerial bombs were again reported, the bursts being smaller than heretofore encountered. We claim 10 destroyed, 6 probables, 3 damaged.

5. Flak was first encountered off Phrisian islands, the bursts being off at distance and ineffective. It was moderate to intense over the target, accurate for altitude but off on deflection. Flak ships were active off German coast, their fire being fairly accurate at 18,000 feet.

6. (1) A/C #666, B-17, hit at I.P. #3 engine out, four feet off wing, no chutes.

(2) B-17, #214, under control at target.

(3) A/C #806, after target, hit but under control.
(4) B-17 ditched 54° 0' N, 4° 0' E; 8 chutes out.

7. Hil.

8. Very heavy and effective smoke screen, apparently burning for an hour at target.

Aerial bombs were seen to break up into smaller ones when


B. Statistical.

1. 21.
2. 7.
3. Wilhelmshaven - 14.
4. None.
5. None.
6. None.
11. 3.
12. 10 x 500 G.P.
13. 140 x 500 G.P.
14. 0.
15. 40 x 500 G.P.
16. 30 x 500 G.P.

6. None. 7. 3. 8. 0. 9. 0. 16. 30 x 500 G.P. 17. 0. 18. 3. 19. 30.


9. 0. 19. 30. 10. 0. 20. Primary, 1245 Hrs., 22,000'

released resembling incendiaries before exploding.



Show direction, approx. time and type E/a of each attack with arrow.

<u>Above</u> with med arrow - Below with green - Level with brank, red.




Write numbers of our A/C in circles.

Draw lines through circles not applying.

Block out our missing A/C in Red.





GROUP 306

N.B. Group with which this place flew is writerner.

COMBAT DUPLICATION CHECK FORM

Show direction, approx. time and type E/A of bach attack with arrow. Above wi. Retxarrow - Below with green - Level with black, red.

If actual formation is completely different from position of circles turn page over and prepare diagram on back.



Write numbers of our A/C in circles, Draw lines through circles not applying, Block out our missing A/C in Red. wissing

DESTY SERVED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356

HEADQUARTERS 306th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Intelligence Officer

APO 634 21 May, 1943

SUBJECT: Enemy Opposition Report for Mission of 21 May, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bomb Group.

1. Plak.

FIBCUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section

(DECLASSFIED PER

Plak was first encountered today off the Phrisian Islands, the bursts being off at distance and ineffective. Over the target it was moderate to intense, accurate for altitude but off somewhat on deflection. Plak boats were active at the German coast and their fire was fairly accurate at 18,000 feet. There was nothing unusual about the bursts today, the same black and white ones being reported.

2. Fighter Opposition.

Fighter opposition was intense, upwards to 100 E/A

comprised principally of FW 190's and a few ME109's being reported.

They were first encountered near Heligoland island but no attacks

were made on our formation until the IP was reached. They came up in

groups from both sides, then peeled off in 2's and 3's and made their

attacks head on from 10 to 2 o'clock, afterwards returning to make

tail attacks. The fighting continued vigorously until the formation

was well out to see on the way home, but the pilots again appeared

inexperienced although determined. We claim 10-6-3.

3. Aerial Bombing.

Aerial bombing was continued again today with an increase in the number reported, the bursts, however, being somewhat smaller in size than heretofore encountered. Some of the bombs were seen to have been shunted off by FW's flying head on into formation, Climbing steeply when bombs were away. There was a report that the bomb seemed to break up into several smaller ones, resembling incendiaries, before exploding.

JOHN B. WRIGHT, Major, AC, S-2

5/

TO 306 BOMBER GROUP 367 SQDN THURLEIGH CR) HQ 12 GROUP INT.
FROM HUTTON CRANSWICK
SPECIAL REPORT ON FORTRESS NGY221895 OF 367 U.S. SQDN. OF 306
BOMBER GROUP. TOOK OFF THURLEIGH AT 0930. TARGET WILHELMSHAVEN,
TARGET APPROACHED ON A COURSE OF 160 DEGS. GERMAN COAST SEEN AT
1230 TARGET BOMBED FROM 26,000 FT. AT 1240. MUCH FLAK AT
APPROXIMATELY 125 ENEMY A/C WERE MET IN THE TARGET AREA.
1. F.W. 190 WAS HUT AND WENT DOWN WITH SMOKE COMING FROM IT.
AE A COURSE OF 306 DEGS WAS SET FOR BASE ENGLISH COAST SEEN
AT 1453 HOURS CROSSED S. OF HUMBER. A/C LANDED HUTTON
CRANSWICK 1514. WEATHER. VISIBILITY POOR. = 16458

C 2ND LAST LINE WA AT... 1543 . Q

un si ra 6 so ra

GPI. THU R.... 211830.... METCALF... VA (KKK)

229815.Mitt.

Target Wilhelmshaven

1. Route fellowed.

I. P. to target to West end of Spiekeroog Is.

Visibility at Target (Any condensation trails?) Glear at target.
 No condensation trails.

3. No. of A/C over Target. 19

4. Fernation ever target, with height of each A/G. These A/G damaged by Flak to be circled, and if seriously damaged, insert small "8". If any A/G shot down by Flak, say set-

X 21,7001

X 21,900

(X)S

X 22,600

(OVER)

X

X

(X)S

*

Hit at I.P. - Did not return

<u>*</u>

Lest ever target area - unable to determine whether by flak or fighter

5. General Axis of attack (from load A/G if possible) 2360

6. How long did formation fly straight and level before bembing? 20 sec.

7. Turn after bombing. Steep right turn.

8. Position of Group in relation to other Groups. lst over target.

9. What evasive action was taken? Visient changes of direction and altitude.

10. A shert description of Flak on route (if any) and at the Target, including if possible a suggestion as to type of fire control employed - i.e. Centimous following predicted concentrations, predicted barrages, or fixed barrages.

Over the target the flak was mederate, inaccurate, and covered a large area. Described as single bursts with no concentrations or barrages. They did not have the appearance of the usual continuous following fire control. However this is about the only thing it could be. Slight flak from Jever-accurate as to height. Mederate flak from Spickeroog is - accurate. This was reported as bursting in clumps of fives.

11. Any other Geoments, Phenemena, etc.

One crew reported air to air bembing in which the bembe appeared to be shot at them. There was a long red flash as the bemb left the attacking A/G. One plane had two such bombe and two others had one each.

HEADQUARTERS SIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, A-5 APO 633, UNITED STATES ARMI

25 May 1943.


SUBJECT: Report of Operation Against Wilhelmshaven, 21 May 1943.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

- At the direction of Colonel Hughes, the following report on our operation against Wilhelmshaven on 21 May is respectfully submitted.
- Composition of the attacking force and statistics on results are available from intelligence data already at hand, so this report will be confined to the personal observations of this eye witness.
- At 0400 hours Friday, 21 May, the combat crews of the 4th Bombardsont Wing were briefed on their operation against Maden, which was timed to precede by a few minutes the operation of the lat Bombardment Wing against Wilhelmshaven. At 6500 hours came the second briefing, at which the lat Ming cumbet crows were given the following date:
 - a. Designation of primary and secondary targets(no last resort);
 - h. Specific mission: to destroy subsarine construction yards in the Bauhaven at Wilhelmshaven;
 - g. Houte from base to I.P. to target and return to base;
 - i. Conignation of officers leading group, equadrons and elements;
 - a. Weather and wind forecast along route throughout day;
 - f. Expected volume of flak, enemy fighter interception, and amoke screens;
 - g. Radio and signals data effective throughout mission:
 - in Rates of speed, climb and bombing interval to be used;
 - I. Re-designation of primary target on epidiascope, and
 - 1. Sussing-up of mission by Col. Putnam and Lt. Col. Wilson.
- Following briefing, I cleared with Colonel Putnem and was assigned my place as starboard nose gunner in Capt. Magoffin's plane #--993; draw flying goar and wont to dispersal, where orew assembled well in advance of take-off time. Pilot was Capt.Magoffin; co-pilot, let It. Mock, navigator, lat Lt. Howenstein; bomburdler, 24 Lt. Travie. Except for the co-pilot, recently arrived, this grew of officers and their gunners have been together since leaving the United States last January. completed 16 missions successfully, and are capable and confident.
- Take-off was set back from 0900 to 0930 hours, due to unfavorable weather reports. Weather at base included ground hase, very light wind, and overcast at 3500'. We took off at 0933 hours, and climbed quickly to our place in formation: Capt. Magoffin led 369 Squadron, in the left and high position of our Group(the 306th). The 306th Group was again assigned to fly at the lowest level: 22,000; it was behind and below the leading 91st; formation of planes, squadrons and groups are shown on Page 2 below. The 21 planes of 306th Group were again led by Lt.Col.Wilson, with Capt.O'Hara flying as co-pilot for the day. OFCAFI

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Page 1.



353 Grows 26,0001

104 Group

25,000

91 Group

30% Group

24,0001(303)

23,000'(91st

22,000;

306 Group

← - 101st Opmbat Wing - →

---- 102nd Combat Wing ----

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Pago 2.

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- Arriving at 3400' over buse, just below the overcust, we of the 306th proceeded a few miles southeast and there ploked up the 91st at about the same altitudes than following the 91st we flow on course of 13° to March; then almost due north to Louth, up in Lincolnshire, some 80 miles from base. These lags were not flown quite as scheduled; to say that we picked up the 91st was an error - we almost picked them up, but they had disappeared in the overcast above their base, just as we arrived, leaving a message for us with their control office (a message which we never received) to "join them at 8,000 above the overcast". Both 91st and 306th, therefore, climbed up through the overcast on these northerly legs, and finally emerged in very ragged formation at 10,000 near louth, where we picked each other up, with the aid of Aldie lamps, and reformed our wide fermation fairly well before crossing the coast at North Coates at 1040 hours. The overcast continued to force us higher and higher; the weather in front of us appeared to be increasingly difficult; a ceiling of high cirrus was evident above us at approximately 28,0001. Over North Coates the 91st was at about 12,0001 and still climbing; the 305th was skinning the tops of the overcast at about 11,000 and still climbing; formation was loose and difficult, and our hope of keeping well below the enemy redar serven until mearing target wam by this time entirely gone. It was obvious at this point that the weather would be unfavorable, and that this attack would find the enway fully alert.
- 7. Soon after leaving the coast, still skimming through the tops of the still-climbing overcast, Lt.Col.Wilson had only 6 planes in the 367 and 368 squadrons combined; Capt.Nagoffin led 7 planes of the 369 squadron, having had 2 planes turn back abortively; the whole 306th Group was therefore only 15 planes at this point, the other 4 being unaccounted for, somewhere in the clouds below and behind us. We continued to tail the 91st, below and behind them, in this formation all the way past the I.P.
- 8. Behind and above us we now saw the 3 Groups (305d, 305th, 351st) of the 162d Combat Wing, who had located and joined us over the coast as we went out on a source of 56° from North Coates, and when we "turned the corner" at 54°40':03°10' to a course of 86°, we could see our whole force, which by then was reduced from 98 planes to the 77 which eventually attacked. We went on oxygen early, and reached hombing altitude considerably earlier than scheduled, due to the high cloud below us and the front which was encountered midway across the North Sea. Temperatures dropped, and windows were kept free of frost and ice with some difficulty.
- 9. When the force turned in on the last leg toward the I.P., we came in eight of the snewy coast considerably farther west than expected,—north of Exden rather than north of Wilhelmshaven and we could see the planes of our 4th Wing over Ewden. Veering to the left, we proceeded to parellel the Frician Islands, still well out to see, until we regained our scheduled course and approached our I.P. on a course of about 140°. There we made a charp right turn, almost on schedule at 1232 hours, and went in for the final ren-up to target on a course of 210°, at 22,000° altitude.
- 10. Our high-altitude and exposed approach had given the enemy every opportunity to adjust his defences in careful, leisurely, complete fashion: every enemy fighter between Helland and Hasburg could easily have been put into the most favorable position for attack; every heavy flak gun would be fully alarted and manned; every smoke screen in that corner of Germany was started long before our exact destination was disclosed.

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- One of the higher groups reported that about 10 enemy fighter wore seen to come up from Heligoland; we were too far to the southwest to The first fighters we saw, just before rounding the corner observe this. at the I.P., were a swarm of FW.190s circling above us and in front of us. As we approached, they divided into 12 which circled in front and to our left, and 18 which eireled an front and to our right, between our axis of flight and that of the 91st Group. Another lot was visible in the distance, to the right of the front of the fist, but we sould not count them, and did not have time. These FW.190s had climbed to altitude well sheed of wa, and did not attack until we were committed to the appreach to the barbing run. They were black and eilvery many had yellow noces; they graved up to attack, concentrating on the leading planes of each squadren of plat and 305th groups, particularly on the individual plane leading each of these two Groups, When they came is to attack, they did not rush us individually, but two and three and four of them streamed in at once, on each side, from il and l o'elock, opening fire mear their extreme range, and not broaking off until past us. One pilot said later: "I had to sort of lift my wing to let 'en under". The attacks us observed were from just above, even with, and just below our level; they were all carried through with determination; the fighters in breaking off, being usually on their book in a helf well, went off and down and back in a steep dive, then climbed quickly back to the queen in front of us, which was never without at least half a desen fighters waiting in it. With our three guns in the some, and our top turret guns, we had many shots at them, and we know we made some hits, but we couldn't prove anything, as mone of us sould stop to look back or check up on any one plane. There were so many attacks in those few minutes short of the target that name of us stopped to check up.
- I had seen: three individual ranging chots, about 10 seconds apart, all very good as to altitude (22,000°), chay for range, and not far off to our right. The third of these hit the center plane of 368 squadren right in the belly, under the pilots, and this plane immediately settled down out of fermation, with at least one engine afire. After falling behind and wallowing lower, it want into a long steep dive to the right, then leveled off with evident difficulty at perhaps 3,000° and dropped slowly to the water just inside the island of Spiekeroog. I did not see the plane satually strike the water, and I saw no chutes at all, but I believe it ditched very close to this island. From these three ranging shots, a predicted flak concentration came up within approximately one minute, just at the time when we should have been starting our actual bombing run. Had we been where we were supposed to be, the flak would have scored many hits; as it was, fragments street many of our planes, but only the plane described above can be said to be lost to flak alone.
- ahead, above and to our gight, started its final bomb rum in spite of the fighters which were still streaming in. Before we were well into our bomb rum, however, we saw the 91st leader drop his 10 x 500-15, beams, followed at once by the bambs from all the other 91st please. They were obviously early, short of the target, yet they dropped them all, and made an abrapt right turn, away from the target and sawy from us, too- at least li minutes sooner them expected. (It developed later that energy fighters had mounded everybody in the mose of the 91st leader's plane, so they toggled all their bombs off rather than hang up the whole formation but we couldn't know that, at the time.) All we were sure of was that they had dusped bombs and left usour 13 planes uncovered to the fighters in the middle of our bomb rum.

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Pago 4.

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- only a few accounts into it when we saw our froup humberdier together all leads off a nearly 50 accounts early. So we together ourself two, and so the like rest of our throup, and then we turned sharply to right and not out to make up noth the ylat throup, in a general northwesterry direction. The subject cought the camery fighters by surprise, momentarily, and the carefully promited borregs of enemy flak came up over the target to find none of an absent to be left. There seemed to be at least 120 bursts of flak in the concentration, probably from 24 to 26 guns. After we had turned, started a siling to seeme, and picked up speed to almost 170 IAS, the fighters harried errored our is to an a right flanks and reformed shead of us, as before. The flak unused us a little, also, but not systematically or accountely.
- At this stage we met, in addition to the original PN.170s alto yellow nones, various other energy fighters: Me. 1097's in considerable numbers, a few (5 or 6) Me. 1098e, and some FW. 190e which was all-black, and some which This assurtment were not as determined attacked as our were blue-and-allver. original lot, but we couldn't tell that in advance, so we had our hands very full all the way out to the coust, soross the Printer Islands (new Sultrus) and on out to sea, for they followed we for some time, having plenty of gus. Accord these attackers were some which shot at us with reckets, and by comparing notes with other squadrons and other Groups, the following consensus of apinion has buen reached: st least 4 energy fighters, equipped with 2 or 3 rooket butes on the under side of each wing, attacked us with these new projectiles, which we mave evidently been mistaking, in many cases, for air bombs. There have town some few cases of estual air bombing, but most cases so reported are now thought to have been rockets. I aid not see any bursts from these rocket and justificity observers said they are email black bursts, like a small flak shell would make. I did see several rockets launched - or what I ballave were rockets - the classy flighter stayed wall off in front, perhaps 1500 yards - and blased assy with a shot from under each wing. A blaze lit up the bottom of each of his wings first it looked like he was abooting with about 3 cannon-but then he book & a parent that the blace was from under his wings, not from his add-sings. The projectile left a trail, like an oversise tracer shell might do, and the rounes evisently borst either upon contact or at a predetermined range. Other Scoups said that one B-177 was book to these rockets; if so it was not from the Booth.
- After leaving the enemy count, we last altitude rapidly, and ware soon under 10,0001, off oxygen, and making for home as best we could. He ware particularly on the lookout for Ju. 88u in pursuit; others said they saw some, out we new now. One or two twin-engine fighters, said to be Me.210., followed our higher groups- one of them all the way to 30 Kast, but we did not see them. We and the 91st both had cripples to look after, and we gradually came down in anthumber of transfer are transfer of sund betterfit our square out transfer utilization back to base. One of the 91st cripples could not make it, and witched had early; the others we would see were able to get back, although one of our just analy reacted the inglish coart. He came neck under the oversest, which was still now, and turough the ground bure, which was still pretty bad. We are shed the English coast, coming back, worth of the Wash, when we thought we were south of the Made, de did the Group mayigator, so we lost a little time getting oriented before atraightening out for the run back to base, where we touched down at exactly 1558 hours. Our plans had several .303 bullet holes, neveral available Than holes and one Elman around strike, but nobody in the crew was injured. Our Group had a planes situating but one of these press subsequently got paper.

C. E. Walter

17. My favorable impressions, which were many, include:

a. Skillful leadership of 306th Group by It.Col.Wilson, in spite of very difficult meather conditions and heavy enemy attacked his plane had two engines struck, besides other damage.

D. Improved condition and performance of these new H-17Fa, with factory-built ness gum installation and desend oxygen system.

9. Skill and judgment shown throughout flight by Capt.Magoffin; excellent fermation flying, constant care of his wing mon, and outstanding leadership of his entire squadron all the way.

d. Competence, confidence and high morals of all crew mambers, officers and mon-come alike - even higher than heretofore.

a. Much improved messing and interrogation upon return to base.

18. Unfavorable impressions, caused by beary losses and poor bossing, raised a number of questions. I attended the critique of 23 May at let Wing and heard most of the answers. The critique itself was entelless; a very fine procedure, ably conducted, for fact-finding and future planning. These questions, bowever, still remain unantwered:

a. In order to destroy the Wilhelmshaven submarine yards, would not a leading which included insumilary bembe have been more efficient than one which depended emittedy upon high explosive?

h. After leaving the English coast above 10,000 in very loose formation, with only 77 planus left cut of the original 98, and with the knowledge that early enemy reder interception was inevitable, and with a weather from ctill to pass through, why was the mission not turned back? If it was for the purpose of covering the 4th Hing's mission, acade not that one have been profitably esscelled also?

a. When the lat Ming found itself approaching a fully-elerted energy count at Enden, rather then at Milhelmshaven, why was the wing lad on to the original target, then scraping up every energy fighter from Holland to Humburg? The lat Ming could have turned back even them, or could have bashed Enden with little loss.

d. Why were bombing altitudes set ugain at the favorite levels for Simm.flak (22,000° and up), when altitudes of 25,000° to 28,000° would again have saved two planes and their cross?

19. Swammari.

) navernile -

-

of the 980 x 500-lb.bembs takes off the ground, 140 bembe were brought back. Of the remaining \$40 bembe, 27 fell em pay dirt, near the target, according to photographic interpretation of the bemb plot. The price of this 3% success was 7 planes and cross, plus 3 other planes washed out. A considerable and indeterminate mander of enery fighters were shet down, and opportunity was afforded to study new enemy fighter taction; both queues and rockets.

20, Recommendations.

(see next page)

3% inccess

Towns

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Page 6.

warmen to a second in white come

A Control of the

20. Recognandations.

- a. Perfect measures quickly for better protection of the leading and low groups, against whom the enemy fighters are concentrating as they start the bombing run. The critique brought out this need, and it was agreed then and there to use the XBLOS for this purpose, but there are not many of these, and additional counter-measures will be necessary.
- b. Perfect countermeasures against the energy's long-range rocket attucks. If four such energy planes were so effective against our bumbers, a large number of rocket-firing planes could really give us trouble. To neutralise them, some means must be found of leaving the actual bembing formation and getting at them. Possibly some of the XBiOs could be assigned to fly well above the bombing formation, so that they sould dive and fire down upon the rocket-firing planes as soon as they identified them. But there again, we have not enough XBiOs to do all the work there is for these to do, and additional countermeasures are needed nears.
- c. Assign higher bombing altitudes, to keep as many groups as possible above effective range of Same. Flak. We cannot keep above logina, flak, but in all these months we have only attached one target which had anything larger than Same. Flak. We can render Same. Flak virtually impotent, by keeping our groups at 25,500' and higher, thus saving the 2-planes-per-mission which we have been losing to flak time after time.
- in the an operation looks useromising from the start, and stem as the operation progresses its chance of success looks weree and surse when we have throws away our high cards: look the element of surprise, recepted our effectives by abortions, disclosed to the enemy our numbers, altitude, course, timing, and intentions, so far in advance as to permit him to perfect his every defence, is not the leader of our force justified in turning back? If it were a "maximum effort", full-out, one-shot operation, our bossber crews and their leaders would see it through unquestioningly, to the last make. But when, as in this instance, it is not a full-out, maximum effort, but "just another mission" our bossber crews still see it through unquestioningly, with the highest courage and depend upon their leader to weigh the expenditure of their lives and planes, and to turn them tank when the chance of success has definited to the vanishing point. In this case, here is "hind-sight" based upon conclusions after the event, but I believe that almost all of it was foresecable.

U. H. Meury, Major, Air Corps.

Li Mantey.

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Commanding Officer

A P 0 634, 22 May 43.

SUBJECT: Tactical Comments and Recommendations on Mission of 22 May 1943.

TO : Commanding General, First Bombardment Wing, APO 634.

- 1. It is recommended that, after the bombing force has left the extremely dangerous interception area, the leader be authorized to climb to about 2,500 feet in order that the navigator be given a chance to get a fix, using radio aids. Due to the poor reception over the North Sea, it is necessary to be at this altitude in order to get an accurate fix.
- 2. The lead Group of the 101st Combat Wing dropped their bombs much too early and immediately turned off the bombing run. Our Group continued on course to drop its bombs at the proper time and was then exposed to a severe attack by enemy fighters, since it was away from the protection of the lead Group for a few seconds. It is recommended that the lead Group be ordered to continue on the bombing run for such a length of time as to allow the following Groups to do their bombing.
- 3. It is felt that it was extremely inadvisable to have run this mission due to the problems presented by the very poor weather over the North Sea. It was known before the flight went off that cumulus clouds tops reached 12,000 feet, and that the formations would have to leave England at that altitude. It was soon possible for the enemy to pick up the formation in his grid, thereby giving him an advance warning almost equivalent to a leak in security. By having so much time to prepare, the enemy was able to put up an extremely good defense, thereby thoroughly disrupting our bombing run and causing heavy losses. Since it is our purpose to destroy enemy targets and not to joy ride over Germany, it is felt that this mission should have been cancelled because of weather along the route.

Claude E. Putnam, Colonel, AC, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office Of The Intelligence Officer United States Forces

Robe 3th

23rd May, 1943

Smith's Marrative.

On the raid to Wilhilmshaven, on Friday, 21st May, 1943, 1st Lt. R. H. Smith's a/c 666, letter Z, was hit by a heavy flak burst immediately under the ship, just after bombs were away, at 12:45.

fl and f2 engine acted as though superchargers were knocked out. This slowed the ship down so that it fell out of fermation and became the target for fighter attack. Smith was able to get back into formation by cutting across, pulling 55 inches on his f3 and f & engines.

Just as they began to get over water on the way out, the oil pressure on the #4 engine dropped and they fell out of formation again. The group started sigzaging and Smith caught up once more.

He had hardly caught up, when the #2 prop ran away and he dropped back for the final time. He was then about 18,000 and could see land behind him.

He feathered the \$4 prop. The oxygen system went out at 17,000. The cowling was shot off his \$2 engine. Oil was pouring from the \$4 engine with prop feathered. Fighters were swarming around and the situation looked completely hopeless.

He was now under attack by from 12 to 15 F.M.'s, three or four coming in at a time. The main formation of B17's had started its descent and came down at about 180miles per hour while he could only nurse about 155 from his crippled ship. With one engine, \$3 working properly, he kept up a violent evasive action while his crew gave the fighters hell with their guns.

Somewhere along the line there were fires in the tail, in the ball turret, and in the tail wheel, all from 20mm. R. Waist Gunner S/Sgt. C. W. Durham was a factor in putting these out.

Somewhere along the line the #2 engine saught on fire and the co-pilot 2nd Lt. R. McCallum succeeded in putting the fire out.

At seven er eight thousand feet, Smith decided they would have to ditch and ordered his erew to take position in the Radio Compartment. They were out of amountion, except in the top turret. Two fighters were still attacking. These were probably selled out by radio to take the place of the originals who had to leave as gas or assumition ran out.

The two F.W.'s quickly discovered that the Fortress had no fire power and came in time after time slowly holding their fire until they were sure of a hit. The tail was almost shot off, the wings were full of holes, the nose riddled.

As he came down, he unfeathered the #4 engine, and at three or four thousand feet the #1 picked up, (probably he thinks because only the supercharger had been damaged). Only one fighter was left. Smith came down to within fifty feet, picking up a little as the #1 began to deliver more power.

The remaining F. W. continued to attack. Finally, McCallum, the co-Pilot left his position, went to the top turret, and found the guns o.k. The F.W. was flying along in the same direction at the Fortress, at about the same speed. McCallum caught him cold, by surprise, at 125 yards. The F.W. engine alone filled his sight. He held down the triggers, and watched the bullets rip into him until the F.W. broke into a violent turn with smoke pouring out. McCallum didn't see him hit, but the dir Sea Rescue corvette that picked them up told them there was a German down close to them. This was the only German in the vicinity, so McCallum is probably the only co-pilot in the theatre with a valid claim to a F.W.

This last F.W. was disposed of at exactly 14:00 hours. Somewhere during this period, another B-17 #1 27 DFT came upon the scene, he d protect them until the last fighter was down, circled, came to their level and waved. Smith has no clear idea of exactly where he was, thinking it to be from 75 to 125 miles from the German coast. This crew, which is from another group, should be able to pin point the position better than anyone else.

Finally while 50 feet off the water, the #1 engine gave out, and in spite of all Smith and McCallum could do, air speed dropped to 135, 125, 115, 110, and the ship ditched at exactly 1421 1/2.

Ditching procedure was perfect, the landing excellent. All the doors were closed, the crew assembled in the radio compartment. The ship with practically no gaseline left stayed up three minutes. The crew launched the two large dinghies, as well as two individual dinghies. These were tied together, the large ones side by side, the smaller ones trailing.

The co-pilot, standing on the wing, got into the dinghy with only wet feet. The pilot fell or slipped under the wing but got aboard without difficulty. Although the sea was fairly calm, before long all were soaked to the skin.

During the afternoon and night they ate some of the food in the escape kits and took some of the benzedrine tablets. In the morning, they had ice in their hair and on their eyebrows and their elothes were covered with frost.

During the entire period they kept their dinghy radio in operation.

They ditched at 14:21 on Friday afternoon. Sometime Saturday afternoon they began to hear what they thought were moters. They would stop paddling, and listen, and blow on their whistles. At 19:50 hours they were all safe aboard the Deep Sea Rescue Corvette.

The crew told them they could hear the whistles through the fog before they could see the flares.

They were landed at Epingham, and flown back to base on Sunday, 23rd May.

The Deep Sea Rescue people would like someone from the U.S. forces to visit them and learn how their procedure differs from Air Sea Rescue or especially Channel Work, where the people in difficulty are likely to be much nearer shore.

Smith thinks the cord holding the dinghy to the B 17 is too strong. This is designed to break as the B 17 goes under, releasing the raft. He and McCallum standing on the wing had all they could do to break the cord and release the dinghy. He thinks some gadget or elipper fastened in the compartment would be of use to cut the cord quickly. Smith's erew claim 11 destroyed.

One of the men took a camera into the dinghy with him and took a number of pictures, a set of which is attached.

JOHN B. WRIGHT, Major, AC, Group 8-2.

Prints meutioned above to follow

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Information necessary for Submission of Battle Casualty Reports:

	21/5/43 (Date)
(a)	Name /AMES E NILNER (First) (diddle) (Last)
(b)	army Serial Number 16054772
(c)	Organization: 367th Bomb Sq (H); 368th Bomb Sq (H); 369th Bomb Sq (H);
	423rd Bomb Sq (H) (NOTE: Underline words applicable).
(d)	Position in Plane: Pilot; Co-Pilot; Navigator; Bombardier; Aerial Engineer
	Radio Operator; Waist Gunner; Lower Turret Gunner;
	Tail Gunner. (NOTE: Underline w ords applicable).
(e)	Time of Casualty: 12:50
(f)	Locality of Casualty: Lt. after target Nature of Injury: 20 nn in body, in fact, \$ legs
(g)	Nature of Injury: 20 nm in body in face & leas
(h)	Cause of Injury: 20 nn
Offic	er Submitting Information:
	Diffe Ch Lea
	MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Information necessary for Submission of Battle Casualty Reports:

DECLASSFIED PER FIRCUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section, 3,3

	$\frac{\mathcal{H}/\mathcal{S}/43}{\mathcal{I}}$ (Date)
a)	Name H L Cox (First) (Middle) (Last)
b)	Army Serial Number
c)	Organization: 367th Bomb Sq (H); 368th Bomb Sq (H); 369th Bomb Sq (H); 423rd Bomb Sq (H) (NOTE: Underline words applicable).
a)	Position in Plane: Pilot; Co-Pilot; Navigator; Bombardier; Aerial Engine
v	Radio Operator; Waist Gunner; Lower Turret Gunner; Tail Gunner. (NOTE: Underline w ords applicable).
e)	Time of Cusualty: 1250
٤)	Locality of Casualty: Over Wangeronge
5)	Nature of Injury: Romin. fragments in both arm- cuts
1)	Cause of Injury: Frattle
fic	eer Submitting Information:
, ,	
	SHOLE
	MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

DECLASSIVED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, 745005

By RIB VIII WILL BAR Date 1/6/4/

45	rmation necessary for Submission of Battle Casualty Reports:
NES	21/5-/43 (Date)
(a)	Name Voka 77. VESSUD- (First) (diddle) (Last)
b)	Army Serial Number
(0)	Organization: 367th Bomb Sq (H); 368th Bomb Sq (H); 369th Bomb Sq (H);
	(423rd) Bomb Sq (H) (NOTE: Underline words applicable).
(d)	Position in Plane: Pilot; Co-Pilot; Navigator; Bombardier; Aerial Engine
	Radio Operator; Waist Gunner Lower Turret Gunner;
	Tail Gunner. (NOTE: Underline w ords applicable).
(e)	Time of Casualty: Over target.
(f)	
(g)	Nature of Injury: 30 calibre wound.
(h)	Cause of Injury: Hit in thigh.
Offi	icer Submitting Information:

MEDICAL

OPERATIONS

		A/C Number 629	LetterDate_	21/5/43
	Bomb Load /DX 500 H.E. Ind	end.	Position in Formati	<u>on</u>
	Time Took Off. Time Land	led) x x x x	X
1.	HOT NEWS to be phoned in? Yes		Х Х	X
	Menanto.	X	X. X	XX
	Friendly A/C in any kind of di		W: Give Rank and Ini	tials
	(Give position, time, altitude	, full	Manes 1	Pilot
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2 the 13/7	nest dem 54°20' 6°20' last fry	the affirmation of	1 William	lav.
The I	when the 912 grap.	A V	A Killing.	· dance
2.	TARGET ATTACKED:	1/5 h	T. cauge.	Radio
	Primary Time: 12:43	1/3/C.	E. June.	op T.
	Alternate Height: 22.57	10 28 1.	CC 4 H	Ball T.
	Last Resort Heading: 2/0	SIGN	S. Juli	R. Laist
	(circle) Duration Bomb Run: .?	5/2	1. Name I	. Laist
		3/5.1		Cail G.
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4.	Observed RESULTS OF BOXBING: (
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	Lots had	Name man.	If family rome for	
	Other Bombing: Maga wax	. 7011.		
5.	Any PHOTOGRAPHS taken: Yes? ((No?)	Marian - Verre - Alacia, C. I. Se Birot - As Raula pages -	
	GROUND TARGETS ATTACKED BY GUA		nome.	
7.	ROUTE (If different than ords	red) (If ABORTIV	E give time, place,	height of
	Antas flamed the South	flower. on m	Lat.	
	TEARNIED. (Te it aggarted mini	mithal	ver taget ht got	moned up.
0.	V.EATHER: (If it affected missi	sold g	rj mi.	
9.	FLAK: Encountered on way out,	A CANAL STATE	way home.	
	A/C modera	tiverise, of Burs	Bucsta in re-	Accuracy
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12'	47 leser 2152	Slyht 11.	Onjight.	Reart for Light
•	Orew observations about Flak:	I little le	h holem mm	7.

DECLASSFIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,
By RLB Off WAR Date 1/8/4/1

	ME 109Fs. Inthe seen) (Types), with us to
(Estimated total number of E/A	seen) (Types),
If teliplant met + flew parallel until s	or male tree in to A theal with out
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to Short formand about of FW prantite	
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(Tactics of E/A)	
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(Color marking that than from	n.
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A)	10 April 12
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	each claim.
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	Andrew Service States
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signals; activity at airdromes port	dumites, camouitage, smoke screens, ens
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signals; activity at airdromes, port centrations of vehicles, troops, ves full paper of 54 to 5 40 m 54	cs, water-ways, roads, railroad yards; cossels; landmarks, new enemy installations
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signals; activity at airdromes, port centrations of vehicles, troops, ves full property of Sunday and Sunday a	of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A., Cause) ion in A/C, type of injury, how and THE.)
signals; activity at airdromes, port centrations of vehicles, troops, ves full property of 50 % of 50	ion in A/C, type of injury, how and THE.)

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UEULASSFIED FER ELECUTIVE CRIDER 12356, Section 3.3,

5		INTERROGATION FORM	
0	Sur S	SQUADRON 367 368 369 423 A/C Number 991 Letter Date	
3	E	Bomb Load 10-570 H.E. Incend: Position in Formation	on ;
M	The second of the	Time Took Off 1932 1 Time Landed VV 7 X X X X	X ×
33,	1. н	HOT NEWS to be phoned in? Yes No X X X Details: X X X	XXX
So on	service.	CREW: Give Rank and Ini	X
Section	A Contract	Friendly A/C in any kind of distress? (Give position, time, altitude, the VC. Magoffin P	ilot
12356, Det	1 at	t 1327 hours raw 17 go. 2 det. A Black. Co	
KARA	- 13	in in water with sady 2 tot. NE Howenstein No	iv. C
88	7	0/4-4	omb.
AE O	2. <u>T</u>	TARGET, ATTACKED:	dio
	P	Primary Time: 1243 D.L. Hinchaugh To	As to the second
E S		Alternate Height 91,900. P.P. Nolas Cio Ba	
	L	Last Resort Heading: 2/0° Circle)	
TASS BY	Ď	(circle) Duration Bomb Run: Osuado Styl. T.A. Rosato. Ta	il G.
8	3. N	## - TEN TO TO THE TEN TO THE TOTAL CONTROL OF THE TOTAL CONTROL OF THE TOTAL CONTROL OF THE TOTAL CONTROL OF T	bortive:
1		Observed RESULTS OF BOABING: (For this plane or others)	
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	9	of . We followed.	7 aving
	Ót	Other Bombing: Md - we were among first our are	ia,
	5. Ar	Any PHOTOGRAPHS taken: Yes? No?	odorzania k k sk
		GROUND TARGETS ATTACKED BY GUNFIRE AND RESULTS: MC	
	7. <u>RC</u>	ROUTE (If different than ordered) (If ABORTIVE give time, place, h turn; reason for returning early, and disposition of bombs.)	eight of
	eyese	Mu:	
	8. <u>v.</u> E	EATHER: (If it affected mission) Nage our target,	
The second secon		FLAK: Encountered on way out, at target and on way home.	
	Ti	Fime Place Height Type (light; Color Location	Accuracy
		of heavy), intense, of Bursts in re- A/C moderate or Bursts lation to A/C slight.	

Moderate in ad out. Not was accurate, Took range shots own court

Crew observations about Flak:

FINCULIVE ORDER 12356, Section

Crew observations about Flak: __

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

FINCULIVE ORDER 12356, Section

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FINCULIVE ORDER 12356, Section

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Orew observations about Flek;

4. Allhiharder

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8. LEATHER: (If it affected mission)

9. YLM: Encountered on way of at target and on way home.

Time Place Reight Type (light, Color Leonblon Accuracy of Bursts in re-

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Crew observations acoust Flak:

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\N//			
Land Down 200	INTERROGATI	ON FORM	
SQUADRON 367	368 369 423 A/C Num	ber // Letter D	ate 21/5/4
Bomb Load V-	1000 H.E. Incend.	Position in For	mation
Time Took Off	Time Landed /J	У	X
1. HOT NEWS to b	e phoned in? Yes No	X X X X X	X X
a contract of the contract of		X X	X
Enjandly 4/0		CREW: Give Rank and	Initials
details)	in any kind of distress?	oft. Salada.	Pilot
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dt 10000	(n 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1		Bomb.
2. TARGET ATTACK	ED: to the state of the state o		Radio
Primary	Pime:		Top T.
Whiternate I	leight: "		Ball T.
proug als	ne. We continued	ru coure at	R. Waist
Lyconation Bond	end for several m	inutes but found	L. Waist
no traw of	formation."		Tail G.
und raw.	7 40 11. 13 30 1	ettisoned: Returned:	Abortive:
4. Observed RESUL	TS OF BOMBING: (For this)	plane or others)	
Own Bombs:	Brought fack	bombo	
		•	
Other Bombing:	No sourvalion	e.	

- 5. Any PHOTOGRAPHS taken: Yes? No?
- 6. GROUND TARGETS ATTACKED BY GUNFIRE AND RESULTS:
- 7. ROUTE (If different than ordered) (If ABORTIVE give time, place, height of turn; reason for returning early, and disposition of bombs.)
- 8. V.EATHER: (If it affected mission)
- 9. FLAK: Encountered on way out, at target and on way home.

Time	Place	Height of A/C	Type (light, heavy), intense, moderate or slight.	Color of Bursts		Location Bursts in re- lation to A/C	Accuracy
					Salah Salah		
		· Class	de Via come ante		174		
					8	•	

ORDER 12356,

DECLASSFIED PER

INTERPOGATION FORM

ENEMY FIGHTER OPPOSITION: (Estimated total number of E/A seen) (Location and length of fight) head-on a Har (Tactics of E/A) experience (Color, markings, etc. of E/A) CLAIMS 2-11= DESTROYED (Our defensive action) PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out immediately separate CLAIM FORM for each claim. FIGHTER SUPPORT 12. OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any observations of military importance such as balloons, decoys, dummies, camouflage, smoke screens, enemy signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, roads, railroad yards; concentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations, moke screen at surget pour INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A., E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause) Undekornined INJURIES TO CREW: (Give name, position in A/C, type of injury, how received, PLACE and THE.) Radio Op. - 20 mm fragmen & face, side. 15. DALAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) 20 nn in rtwing 20 nn in #38 in #4 enq 16. TECHNICAL FAILURES: Viadio room, 20mm prop # Heng: 17. CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggestions?) after being det hit didn't san Skalak JOHC ME CO. PLETED 16:50 a fire , without

ORDER 12356,

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Section

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

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	10. ENERY ETCHMED CONTRACT
10	FIGHTER OPPOSITION:
× /	Mole sky filled
0.	10. ENELY FIGHTER OPPOSITION: 100-150 whole sky filled (Estimated total number of E/A seen) (Estimated total number of E/A seen)
10	Types)
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3.	(Location and length of fight)
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Section	Mile is on trager for
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2 3	
12356, Dat	attacks press
	- Uttades pressed on nose - from distance
ORDER	(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) F. W. 's hung back at tail
	(Color, marking at 100 K. W. s here of the
	+ Cobbed shells
F ₀	_ shells_
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KECUTIVE	
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SSFIED By A	PROBABLY
S A	The state of the s
3	DAMAGED
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* 1	Se darate CLAIM FORM
1	11. FIGHTER SUPPORT
7	
	- Marie Mari
	12. OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any observations of military signals; activity at airdycomes, decoys, dumnies, camouflage, smoke some
	importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camouflage, smoke screens, enemy centrations of vehicles, troops, water-ways, roads, railroad words.
	signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, roads, railroad yards; contrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations.
	centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations,
-	new enemy installations,
1	13. INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A.,
	E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause)
	14. INJURIES TO CREW: (Give name, position in 1/2
	Give name, position in A/C, type of injury, how received, PLACE and TIME.)
	+1. Maria
	15. DALAGE TO A/C: (Briefly)
	20.00
	16. TECHNICAL FAILURES:
	17. CREW COLLENGE
	17. CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggestions?)
	To V Q and a suggestions?)
	Lost Josep going up thru Clouds _
	S-2 OFFICER Weld TIME CO: PLETED
	TIME OU! PLEAD

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

moderate or

slight.

Bursts

lation to A/C

Crew observations about Flak:

3-4000 feet - & picker upf - one fights life. ledone stages a lo. ENERY FIGHTER OPPOSITION: rodal. 50 feek-off water gan out- after voiloch - 135- 115- 110- > 3800 RPM wh (Estimated total number of E/A seen) (Types) to. prosselone Har some duighing pectures - Cordson dinglin ace fea (Location and length of fight) Hit by Asideson heavy flack bush when ste the able boch alain - about 18000 - Could see lan CLAIL S 3 Bue DESTROYED PROBABLY DAMAGED Violente Repelers - that one lugine # 3 re (Fill out immediately separate CLAIM FORM for des cent. FIRE, INTAIL -ONEIN each claim FIGHTER SUPPORT BALLTUREST, ONE IN TAIL WHEEL TO MAN DURHAM - 7 or 8000 fut decised would have to ditch - augustus #4 - fix with zer Theo left - but of ammunition public off - unus almost off - Non ribble observations of military importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, carouflage, smoke screens, enemy signals; activity at sirdromes, ports, water-ways, roads, railroad varie; concentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations, Flack books along bay at I.P. Discome up INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A., E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause) (Give name, possition in A/C, type of injury, how 14. INJURIES TO CREVE medical attention peceived, FLACE and TIME.) new nums injuries by the Dup Aca 15. Rescue - on boat 15. DALAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) and at bene-Buttet in the Co-Epingham -TECHNICAL FAILURES: CREW COMMINTS: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggestions?)

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ughy Cord holding dire FIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Secti (Color, markings, etc. of E/A) CLAIMS (Our defensive action) DESTROYED. PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out immediately separate GLAIM FORM for each claim. 11. FIGHTER SUPPORT equito to shell ald toll 12. OBSERVATIONS: Give TWAE, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any observations of military importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camouflage, smoke screens, enemy signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water ways, roads, railroad yards; concentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations, CTAR SAN AVA SERVINOS YS CLARATER STREETS 13. INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A., E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause) INJURIES TO CREW: (Give name, position in A/C, type of injury, how received, FLACE and TIME.) . . . necountered on way out, at target and on way hame. Oding To A/C: (Briefly) (Joint) hard of the state of the 17. CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggestions?) S-2 OFFICER

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FINCULIVE ORDER 12356, Secti

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section

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OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, reentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	LAIMS
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(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Color, markings, etc. of E/A)	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Color, markings, etc. of E/A)	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYER PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT Love OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYER PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT Love OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYER PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT Love OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYER PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT Love OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	LAIMS
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT LOW OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT LOW OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A) (Our defensive action) DESTROYED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT LOW OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
(Our defensive action) DESTROYER PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out separate each cla FIGHTER SUPPORT Lowe OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, reentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, reentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, reentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	immediately
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	CLAIM FORM for
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any comportance such as balloons, decoys, dummies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, accentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any comportance such as balloons, decoys, dummies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, accentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
importance such as balloons, decoys, dumnies, camous signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, a centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	
centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks	observations of military
venicles, troops, vessels; landmarks.	Clage, smoke screens, enemy
WITH THE AMERICAN AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND A	new enemy installations
od moke vereen and larges area	· The stand and the second sections
INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost,	state whether by A a
E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause)	A A
INJURIES TO CRES: (Give name, position in A/C, type received, PLaCE and TILE.)	of injury, how
DALAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) few holes in	D1e
<i>V</i>	
TECHNICAL FAILURES:	A Secretary
.354	
CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggest	
pretty rugged: clouds be	ions?)
S-2 OFFICER Josephah F. Tullway TIME CO. PLET	ions?) Ne us formation.

has the

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

10. ENERTY FIGHTER OPPOSITION:	
(Estimated total number of E/A seen) (Types)	. 610
of the istand - to largel- out to seen 45 friends.	
Believe the fighter came from Heliogland.	
Cane in tril in trail - 4 to 6 at a time. Determ	خط
	A 7 (
came in. Both more and then tail actails	y
(Tactics of E/A)	
Silver ME 1095 - Some black FW.'s	
(Color, markings, etc. of E/A)	
Vallent - turns + changes of alt.	
CLAIMS	
(Our defensive action)	
PROBABLY	
DAMAGED	
(Fill out <u>immediately</u> separate CLAIM FORM for	
each claim.	
11. FIGHTER SUPPORT	
12. OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT (List any observations of military	,
importance such as balloons, decoys, dummies, camouflage, smoke screens, er	nemy
signals; activity at airdromes, ports, water-ways, roads, railroad yards; coentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installation	con-
Deformation - Somote screen over larged - but could see the	larys
INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A.,	
E/A Action Accident or Undetermined Cause)	1.1
Reports that town good was firing at the B-17 which was in	aut
14. INJURIES TO CREW: (Give name, position in A/C, type of injury, how received, PLACE and TIME.)	
Hih. Cox - Tail June _ did not report asymy -	1
	Rys
15. To lis ours often being hit - 1250-120mml, 2	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briedly) fragments in both aum + onton/a	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briedly) fragments in both and + out on fa 1-20 m.m. Subject dualing fragments in both and + out on fa 1- partie of flittle - through nose. 20 m.m. in vertical stables	
15. DAVAGE TO A/C: (Brisdly) hagments in both aum + onton/a 1-20m.m. Suly foundance to more 20 m.m. in vertical stables 16. TECHNICAL FAILURES: through nose. 20 m.m. in vertical stables 30 m.m holy.	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briebly) hagments in both aum + cuton/a 1-20 m.m. substitution have 20 m.m. in vertical stables 16. TECHNICAL FAILURES: To make the substitution of the substitution	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briedly) fragments in both and + cation/a 16. TECHNICAL FATLURES: 17. CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? any suggestions?) The Commendation over the target is necessary.	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briebly) haguments in both aum + cuton/a 1-20 m.m. substitution of the substitution over the target is necessary. 16. TECHNICAL FATLURES: (Any unusual incidents? Any suggestions?) The commission over the target is necessary. What so the objection after they know where we are?	
15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) fragments in both and + cuton/a 15. DATAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) fragments in both and + cuton/a 16. TECHNICAL FATLURES: through nose. 20 m.m. in vertical stables 16. TECHNICAL FATLURES: (Any unusual incidents? any suggestions?) 17. CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents? any suggestions?) Inter-commendation over the target is necessary.	

Crew observations about Flek:

FIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section

10.	ENERY FIGHTER OPPOSITION:	ME 109
	/2 5	F W 190 (Types)
	(Estimated total number of $2/A$ seen)	(Types)
	(Location and length of fight)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	Deveral encourte	1 - w
	heavy black smoke pour	- 1 / /
	heavy Vack smoke pour	single shot.
	(Tactics of E/A)	
		$\Delta r = 2\pi r^2$ () where $r = r^2$
	ar and the second second	•
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	(Color, markings, etc. of E/A)	•
	\ N	
		**
		CLAIMS
	(Our defensive action)	DESTROYED
		PROBABLY
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	DAM OTO
		DAMAGED
		separate CLAIM FORM for
		each claim.
11.	FIGHTER SUPPORT Work	
	*	
10	ODGDUM WYONG GI	
12.	OBSERVATIONS: Give TIME, PLACE, HEIGHT importance such as balloons, decoys, dum	(List any observations of military
	signals; activity at airdromes, ports, w	ater-ways, roads, railroad yards; con-
	centrations of vehicles, troops, vessels	
	mole recens very	900d.
10		•
13.	INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of ou E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cau	r A/C <u>lost</u> , state whether by A.A.,
	-, a sociality is or ordered light	36)
	N. C.	
14.	INJURIES TO CREW: (Give name, position	in A/C, type of injury, how
	received, PLACE and	THE.)
15.		-
15.	DALAGE TO A/C: (Briefly) hole 3 L	u tail & wong.
		,
16.	TECHNICAL FAILURES:	
	•	And the second of the second
17.	·	· ·
~ ; •	CREW COMMENTS: (Any unusual incidents?	with andReartous()
	1	
	S-2 OFFICER Joneman F. OTullur	CLE CO: PLETED
	THE PARTY OF THE P	

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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

10. ENELY FIGHTER OPPOSITION: (Estimated total number of E/A seen) masa. Kar ation and length of fight (Color, markings, etc. of E/A) CLAIMS DESTROYED MO PROBABLY DAMAGED (Fill out immediately separate GLAIM FORM for each claim. 11. FIGHTER SUPPORT OBSERVATIONS: Give TELE, PLACE HETGHT (List any observations of military importance such as ballooms, decoys, dummies, cambuflage, smoke screens, enemy signals; activity at sirdromes, ports, water-ways, reads, railroad varis; concentrations of vehicles, troops, vessels; landmarks, new enemy installations, Snight seren our larget an 13. INCIDENTS TO FRIENDLY A/C: (If one of our A/C lost, state whether by A.A., E/A Action, Accident or Undetermined Cause) sie above INJURIES TO CREE: (Give name, position in A/C, type of injury, how E and THE. Any suggestions?) ichardson PLE CO. PLETED S-2 OFFICER

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356,

quadron	Place where attacked Before target
/C No. 793	Time 1217 Height 22.200
Story of the attack E/A. P-	90, came in at about 1:30 fired and went
	[18일(전)] 19일 개발 기타 (19) [19] 시간 [18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18] [18]
OII AV SOUR AIN. HIST VALA	gunner fired, as E/A swung off, hitting
same. Pieses of comling fell of	ff. Pilot baled out. Tail gunner saw
B/A hit ground.	
	1
(Include above how F/A art	acked; how chose he came; where he was we acked how he looked and acted going away.
hit; howmuch he was damaged;	& how he looked and acted going away.
	······································
. Diagram of attack	On Diagram, show a, which of our a/O was attacked;
X about & m	p, direction of E/A attack;
W X off form	ation c. sun position.
X	
X X X X X	Data on Combat
X	X a. Our heading 210° X b. wisibility Good
	X b. wisibility Good X X c. type of E/s. Fw 190
	d. level of attack;
	From high above above
	(Check leval
Our Gun Positions Firing on E/A	One) below_
and the state of the second property of the state of the second	very low
ames S/Sgt. D. B. Heff	
ositions Right waist gumner	
. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged	
Corroborated by 8/3st. G. G. Ho	lt. 8/Sst. Coulson
Position in A/C Ball turret	Tail gunner
Other A/C fining at the second	
Other A/C firing at the same time	me?
Comments of the interrogator:	destroyed
The New York Comment of the Comment	
ACCOUNT ACCOUNTS	

UNDIASSFIED FER ELECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section, 3.3.

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E ORDE	3
ELECUTIVE ORDER 1	190
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ECIASSPIED	By (
B	

Proup 306	Date_21/5/13
Squadron_368	Place where attached over target
√C No. 793	Time 1250 Height 22 200
	Fre 190, came 6 ofclock level. Tail gunner.
	ntinning fire to shout 90 yds. E/A blev
up disintegrating. Themy	pliot did not bale out.
Market Market San Control of Cont	DESTROYED
	The second secon
(Include above how Fy/A hit; howmuch he was dama	attacked; how close he came; where he war ged; & how he looked and a ted going away.)
. Diagram of attack:	On Diagram, show
	a, which of our A/C was attacke
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	o. direction of E/A attack; c. sun position.
X X A	Y Date on Contact
An in	X Data on Combat X a. Our heading 2100
X They of	X b. wisibility Good
asour	X X c. type of E/. P. 190 d. level of attack;
	From high above
Our Gun Positions Firing on	(Check level level level below below below level
. Our oun restores riry g on	very low
ames s/sgt J. Coulses,	ald reterminentation on chique viscous
ositions	
. If E/A was Shot Down or Dam	and a
Corrobonated by a/aut of Position in A/C Bell to	1, G. Holt
Other A/C firing at the same	time?
Comments of the interrogator	dest royed
	*
A STATE OF THE STA	
If formation was very differ-	Time 14re
ent from standard, show on	
eack of sheet.	B. Skålak, lat Lt. AC

	Squadron 368th Pl	Date 21/5/43 .ace where attacked right after target
	/a a.	me 1257 Height 22,200 ft
3	그리고 있다. 물레드 현대 이번 바꾸다는 것이 많아 많아 되었다. 그렇게 되었다.	mer opened fire at 600 yards, tracer
3		R/a relled ever underside was fired
Pate		off wings and ongine. R/A went
	-into vertical dive with more pieces	DESTROYED
MARA	1	DESTI I.B.W.
	(Include above how F.I astracker	i; hos aloss ha cars, wise its was
	in man in man, we me	ow he looked and active going away.)
	2. Diagram of attack:	Cn Dlagren, show
5	X.	a when of our A/C was attacked; o direction of E/A attack; 9 • cl
2	$\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{x}$	c. sun position.
3	X X X X X	Data on Combat
B	X	a, Our heading 3000 b. wisibility good
	X X	d. level of attack;
		From high above
1	3. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/a	One) below v
	Names G. G. Halt	very low
	Positions Ball turret gunner	
	8. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged:	
	Corroborated by Position in A/C	
	Charles and mende another a real grant and another and and another and an another an another and an another and an another an another and an another and an another an another and an another an another and an another and an another an another and an another an another an another and an another an another and an another an another and an another an another an another and an another an another an another and an another an another an another an another an another an another and an another an another and an another an another another and an another an another an another another and an another another and an another another and an another another and an another another another and an another another another and an another a	
	Other A/C firing at the same time?	
	. Comments of the interrogator: _ Destr	eyed.
	4	
	If formation was very differ- Time	

	Group 306 Date 21/5/43
27	Squadron 369 Place where attacked Over water on way h
A	A/C No. 040 Height 13,000
3.3.	Story of the attack- Came in at A o'clock - the ball turret gave him a
	burst at 200 yards. This E/A stopped firing and he blew up. There was
FIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section WARA Date // // //	a large flesh in the front of the plane and the plane went into "a thousand
8	Y. F. Arman and
356,	places
2 2	DESTROYED
EDGE FRANK	(Include above how F. A avtacked; how close
8	hit; howmuch he was damaged; & how he looked much acted going away.)
	2. Diagram of attack: On Diagram, show
T B	a which of our A/C was attacked; b. direction of E/A attack;
1 1 100	c. sun position,
	X X X X X Data on Combat
By RUS	X X a. Our heading X b. wisibility
B	X b. wisibility X X C. type of E/s. Fw 190 d. level of attack;
	Out of formation From high above
(e) ((Check leval. 3. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/A One) below below
	Namos S/Sgt. P. W. Pappas
	Fositions Bell tures
	4. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged:
	Corrobonated by Sgt. A. Stoner Position in A/C Right wasit
	Other A/C firing at the same time? No.
	Comments of the interrogator: Destroyed - there is no question
	about this one.

Time

Capt. S. J. Owen

Interrogator

If formation was very different from standard, show on back of sheet.

	Date 21/5/43
	Squadron 423rd Place where attacked on way out
	A/C No. 557 Time 1254 Height 15,000 ft.
beria	Story of the attack - F0190 was attacking another ship in high group.
3	He came diving down when right waist garner enemed fire at 500 yards.
	Several bursts went into him and he was a series and he was a series when and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series went into him and he was a series when a series we was a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series when a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series when a series were a series were a series which a series which a series
34	Several bursts went into him and he was knocked to one side apparently.
Date	He spun straight down in heavyintense flame and white smoke. Teil gun-
-	ner watched him go into the ground.
KKEA	(Include above how F/A
	(Include above how F/M sotacked; how aloss he called the translation hit; howmuch he was damaged; & how he looked and acted going Exception
	2. Diagram of attack: On Diagram, such
	a which of our A/C was attacked:
	X X C. Sun position.
	X X
	X X a Our heading
4	X X b. wisiblisty good X X c type of E/A Fingo
	Check level
L	b. Our Gun Positions Firms on E/A One) below
₹	Names Sgt. L. A. Skinner very low
	Positions Right waist gumer
	8. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged:
	Correborated by Sgt. E. S. Mason Position in A/C Tail gunner
1	Other A/C firing at the same time?
	Comments of the interrogator:

If formation was very different from standard, show on back of sheet.

Time Interrogator_

Majer John B. Wright.

Group 306	Date 21/5/43
Squadron 369	Place where attacked Just after Is.
AC NO. BAG THE STATE OF THE STA	Time1253 Height nome
Story of the attuck B/A at	tacked from 8 o'clock, high. At 700 year
the left waist gunner opened	var
	up - at 400 yds the E/A stopped suddenly
The second second	s ball turret gunner saw him hit the water
The pilot did not bale.	DESTROYE
	A-2. 1.B.W.
	manuta
(Include above how F/A at	tacked; how close he came, where he was
	; & how he looked and acted going away.)
2. Diagram of attack:	On Diagram, show
X	a. Which of our A/C was attacked
x X x	c. sun position.
x x x x	
	x a. Our heading
x x	A D. W.S.LULLITY ROOM
<u> </u>	X X c. type of E/A 190 d. level of attack;
Not in formation.	From high above there
3. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/A	/onecr Teast
	One) below very low
Names 8/Sgt. C. B. Smith	
Positions Left Weist	
4. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged	
	그렇게 어느 얼마를 보다 하는 것이 모든 사람이 되는 것이 없다.
Correborated by S/Sgt. Position in A/C Ball	P. W. Pappas
Ball	turret
Other A/C firing at the same tim	ne?No
Comments of the interrogator:	The state of the s
	to mit the water.
\	
If formation was a	
If formation was very differ- ent from standard, show on	Time Interrogator
back of sheet.	Capt. S. J. Owen

DECLASSIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,
By RLB MC WARA Date 1/6/4/

Place where attached Near target Time 1250 Height con ft high at 11 clock to attack 2nd ded fire as he went by at 100 yards. th intense flames coming from cockpit. was nearly on ground and be never
high at 11 clock to attack 2nd at fire as he went by at 100 yards. h intense flames coming from cockpit.
high at 11 e clock to attack 2nd sed fire as he went by at 100 yards. h intense flames coming from cockpit. was nearly on ground and be never
h intense flames coming from cockpit.
h intense flames coming from cockpit.
e was nearly en-ground and he never
OVED
DESTROYED I.B.W.
wked; hos aloss he came; where he was a how he looked and acted gold away.)
Ch Diagrem, show
a. William of the all and attended
o. direction of E/A attack; 11:00
Data on Combat
a. Our heading
A 0. "38101 1ty
d. level of attack
From high above -
(Check love). One) below
very low
Marie or adolphic opposes
•
S. C.
d
?
A second
feel weist gumer was extremely medest i
fire never put out.
ma.
Time Interrogator_
Mejer John B. Wright

DECLASSFIED FER ELECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,
By RLB VIII WARA Date 1/6/4/

Group 306 Squadron 369	Di caa whara att	Date 21/5/43	
		acked Just after	
A/C No. OLO	Time_1250_	Height 21,00	0
Story of the attack E/A came fro	a 6 o'clock hig	- as he fired	on us t
tail sunner opened up and kept his			
A/C. The ball turret gummer repor			
He went into a spin and one wing b			
7/ //			I'B'M'
	TOT TO BE SEED OF THE SAME SERVICE AND ADDRESS OF THE SAME SER		
(Include above how E/A atta	cked: how close	he come: where h	A Waa
hit; howmuch he was damaged;	& how he looked	and acted going	away.)
2. Diagram of attack:	On Diagna	m. show	
X X	a. which	of our A/C was a	ttacked
√ x [*] x	c. sun po	ion of E/A attac	k;
X / X	C. Sun pe	5	
X X X X	Data on C		
x Z X	x b. visibi		
	X c. type o	2 E/s. Fx 190	-
$\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{L}_{\Lambda}}$	d. Level	of attack;	-
Out of formation at this time.	Check	high above above level	8
. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/a	One)	below	-
Our Gail TogleTons FIT-12 on 2/4		very low	
lames T/Setu H. L. Cox	grants -a dealer makings		
ositions Tail conner			
. If E/A was Snot Down or Damaged:			
Corresponding 8/8st P. W. P.			
Position in A/C Ball turn	ot .		• ,
Other A/C firing at the same time	14/3/14/1		
The late of the la	Contract to the second second	The state of the s	
Comments of the interrogator: The	a is a definite	y destroyed.	
The state of the s			

UBULASSFIED FER EIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,

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Section 3	2
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Group 306th	Date 21/5/43
Squadron 369th	Place where attacked Over coast
A/C No. 629	Time 1248 Height 21,000 ft.
Story of the attack- FW came	in from 4 e'cleck and high. T/Sgt. Robert
E. Meere, top turret gunner, g	ave him burst at 600 yards. Shet 40 shets
Then gave him 50 shots mere wh	on he was at about eight etcleck. He was
300 yards away. E/A was smeki	ng, then flames. Then he suddenly blew up
and completely disintegrated.	
(Include above how E, A at hit; howmuch he was damaged	tucked; how close he came, where he was
2. Diagram of attack:	On Diagram, show a, which of our A/C was attacked;
x x	b. direction of E/A ttack;
x x x	c. sun position.
x x x x x x	X b. visibility fair
∠x x \	X X c. type of E/A FW190 d. level of attack;
	From high above X
3. Our Gun Positions Firing on E	(Check level
	very low
Names T/Sgt. Rebert E. Meere	
Positions Tep turret gunner	
8. If E/A was Shot Down or Damage	ed:
Correborated by S/Sgt. R. Pe Position in A/C Tail gumer	stersen
Other A/C firing at the same	time?
Comments of the interrogator:	A sure kill.
If formation was very differ-	Time Interrogator
ent from standard, show on back of sheet.	Gaptain Fred Baldwin.

- 11	
Section 3	Date 1/6/9/
Sec.	/st
12356,	A
ORDER	MARA
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Group	Date
Squadron 368	Place where attacked Before crossing coas
A/C No	Time 1247 (?) Height 22,500
\$MAKASA UTUKAN	e in slightly high from 7 olclock. Left
walst started fring at 750 yds.	\$ 300 yards he banked and dove. Left.
wing was on fire and flames shot o	out from engine. Bell turret gunner is
convinced he couldn't put fire out	as it soon enveloped entire plane.
(Include above how F/F avtac	ked; how alloss hores, Roeye by as how he looked and Asted getting away.)
2. Diagram of attack:	On Diagram, show a. which of our A/C was attacked;
x x	o. direction of E/a attack;
X X Y	c. sun position.
x x x x x	Data on Combat
x x	a. Our heading
X	X b. visibility
x x	X c. type of E/s. 10. 109 d. level of attack;
This A/C was alone at this time.	From high above above
2 Our Cun Positions Finish on F/a	(Check leval.
3. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/A	very low
Namos 8/Sgt. R. G. Adams	
Positions Left waist	
4. If E/A was Shot Down or Damnged:	
Correborated by 8/8st. J. P.	El ale
Position in A/C Bell turret	
Other A/C firing at the same time	None
Comments of the interrogator: L	ooks good.
If formation was very differ-	Time Interrogator
ent from standard, show on	
back of sheet.	Weld.

Group306th			Date_	21/5/43
Squadron_369th	Place	where	attacked_	Over tarket
A/C No. 040	Time_	1246	Hei	ght 22,500 ft.
Story of the attack FW190 atta	cked fr	en 6 e	clock lov	and all the ball
turrets in our fernation let re	at him.	Ho t	urned his	plane ever on its
back and bailed out.	inter-efficients exemplese	·		DESTROYE
	**************************************	# 		manufacture (
(Include above how E. 3 attahint; howmuch he was damaged; 2. Diagram of attack; X X X X X X X X X X X X X	& how h	s look On Dia a. whi b. dir c. sun Oata ou a. Our b. via c. type d. lev Fi	gram, show ch of our ection of position. n Combat heading ibility e of E/A el of atta rom high a ck line)	ed going away.) A/C was attacked; E/A attack; 6:00 E/S
Positions Right waist		···		
6. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged: Corroborated by Position in A/C				nggang galang dalam kanang kanang Ngungkarang galang kanang
Other A/C firing at the same tim		•		
Comments of the interrogator:	nie ie s	desti	reyed.	The state of the s
If formation was very different from standard, show on back of sheet.	Time_	aptair	s. J. Ow	Interrogator

5		CCmBaT FORL	Second .
(S)	Group 306th		Date 21/5/43
321	Squadron 367th	Place where att	acked ever target
7	A/C No. 815	Time 1246	Height 26,000 ft.
33	Story of the attack Our pl	ane was flying number	two in an unidentified
	fermation of nine planes. A	n FW came by in front	from the right side
Sec.	and level. Bembardier pumpe	d lead into him start	ing when he was 800 yd
156, S.	away. He started smeking an	d headed dewn. Right	waist gunner saw pilot
235	bail out.		DESTROYED
IN BY	(Include above how E/A		***************************************
BY RIB ONE MARA Date 1/8/4	hit; howmuch he was damas 2. Diagram of attack: X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	Med; & how he looked On Diagrama. which is direct. C. sun pool X Data on Company X b. visibility X X c. type of d. level of From (Check One) E/A One)	m. show of our A/C was attacked ion of E/A attack; sition. ombat ading ? hity fair f E/A FN190 of attack; high above level below very low

If formation was very different from standard, show on back of sheet.

Time_ Interrogator__

1st Lt. Alfred Wold

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SPIED PER ETECUTIVE ORDER 12	KLIS WAY WAR
SOUTH FER ETECUTIVE ORDER 12	BY KLB WMC WAR
ASSETTED PER ETECUTIVE ORDER 12	BY KILLS WITH WAR
CLASSIFIED FIRE EXECUTIVE ORDER 12	BY KLIS UNIC WARA
MACHASSPIED FIRE EXECUTIVE ORDER 12	BY KLIS UMC WASA

quadron	423	Place where attacked Over North Ses.
/C No	666	Time 14:00 Height 50 ft.
almost attacki	off—just about roady ing with impunity thin paition went to ten to	ship out of formation middled with bullets, to to ditch—Crew in ditching positions. Enemy sking our A/C out of assumption. Mc Calloun pret and caught FW cold by surprise at 125 years. Mc Calloun held down triggers watching but.
rip inte (c Calley them.	him until PW broke in	but air sea rescue says there is German dewn plane as our A/C was there one hour later the vicinity.
		DESTROYED
hit	(Include above how E/I	d artacked; how close he case, where he was aged; & how he looked and arted going away)
x x	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	X Data on Combat X X a. Our heading X b. visibility X C. type of E/A d. level of attack: From high above (Check level x
Names	2nd. LA. R. M. Re Cal	Lloun.
Positions	S CoPilot.	
	A was Shot Down or Da	OUNTINEIAL
Corrol Posit	borated by Air Sea Reion in A/C	Hope.
Other	A/C firing at the sa	me time? No.
100		or: This is probably only valid claim ever
- Co	-Pillet.	
1	4644	- Now 22 1042
	ntion was very differ on standard, show on	Time May 23, 1943. Interrogator_

uadron 423		tacked At Sea off Enden
C No. 666	Time 13:52	Height 50ct.
Story of the attack - When en and level, er just below. Bel and epened fire. E/A second	LI turret gunner av	ung his owns to 11 afold
crashing into the sea.	1	
		DESTROY
		A-2, 1.B.W.

(Include above how E/2 a	d; & how he looked	he came, where he was and acted going away.)
. Diagram of attack:	On Diagra	er, show of our A/C was attacked
X	o. direc	tion of E/A attack:
X X X	c. sun p	osition.
x x x x x	X Data on a. Our he	Combat
X	X b. visib	eading 240°
x x	X X c. type	of E/r. FW 190
7	From	of attack; high above
1	(Check	level. 💌
Our Gun Positions Firing on E	/A One	very lcw
mes 8/8gt. Arthur R. Adrian.		
sitions Ball turret.		
. If E/A was Shot Down or Damag	ed:	- NYTHI
Correborated by It. B. H. S. Position in A/C Pilet	00	MEDENTIAL
Other A/C firing at the same	time? No	Trans.
	The state of the s	
Comments of the interrogator:	A certain destrays	d

OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section, 3.3.

MARA Date

·		who keep	N K mak	MIN	
CON			10		20
UUIV	1 2	Des Kan			

C No. 666 Story of the attack - B/A coming	Time 13:46 Height 100 ft.
of this E/A hit the fuselage of and both deve into Drink.	em above. At about 40' to 50' the right the ether E/A seming in from above 6 e'cl
	DESTROYED.
(Include above how R/I arta hit; howmuch he was damaged;	& how he looked and acted going away.)
Diagram of attack: X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	On Diagram, show a. which of our A/C was attacked; b. direction of E/A attack; 6 o'cl c. sun position. Data on Combat a. Our heading about 240 b. visibility god c. type of E/a. IN 190 d. level of attack; From high above (Check level above One) below Very low
tions Tail gunner.	CONFIDERTIAL
orroborated by cosition in A/C	CONLINE
ther A/C firing at the same time	
omments of the interrogator: Thi	s.B 17 was set on fire several times by
A and finally went down in Drin	k. Later all the Grew were rescued.
formation was very differ- from standard, show on of sheet.	Time Interrogator Capt. W. W. Class.

BMP V THU NR 11 31120B

ATTENTION: A-2

PRIORITY IMPORTANT 306BG N-564-D 51 MAY 1943

SUBJECT: EXPLANATION OF ENCOUNTERS REPORT—

OUR A/C 666- MISSION-WILHELMSHAVEN MAY 21, 1943.

1. IN REPERENCE TO 2 CLAIMS BY S/SGT. BILLY J. LAMB.

A. & TIME 13:46, ALT. 100 FT.) 8/SGT. LAMB FIRED

AT FU X3 190 '' COMING IN AT 6 O'GLOCK LEVEL'' FROM APPROXIMATELY

800 TO 400 YARDE. AT 400 YDS. HE TRANSFERRED THE BULK OF HIS

FIRE TO 2ND FV 190 C TIME INCORRECTLY GIVEN, IN TYPOGRAPHICAL

ERROR. AS 13:30 ALT. 5.000 FT.) 'COMING IN ABOVE AT 6 O'CLOCK''.

E/A CONVERGED INTIL BOTH COULD BE SPRAYED VIRTUALLY TOGETHER,

FINALLY COLLIBING AND DIVING INTO THE SEA. S/SGT. LAMB IS

CONFIDENT THAT BOTH E/A WERE SOLIDLY HIT BY HIS FIRE BEFORE

THE TOLLISION OCCURED AND THAT THE COLLISION WAS AN INCIDENTAL

RESULT.

B. CORRECTION IN 2ND CLAIM TOX TIME 13:46 ALT. 100*
INSTEAD OF TIME 13:39 ALT. 5.000.

2. IT IS FELT BY THE GROUP S-2 , AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THESE ? CLAIMS. THAT S/SGT. LAMB'S FIRE WAS AT LEAST THE INITIATING FACTOR IN THE DESTRUCTION OF EACH E/A, AND THAT BOTH ARE PROPERLY CREDITED TO HIM.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER BY:

= JOHN B. WRIGHT,

NAJOR, A.C.

GROUP S-2

HOLD

CC UNDER 2. WE FACTOR INITIATING

our ship en fire with 20 MK, cann	en.	DESTROYED
		A-2, 1.B.W.
(Include above how F/A acta hit; howmuch he was damaged;	cked; how close & how he looked	he came, where he was and acted going away.
Diagram of attack: X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	Data on Oa. Our he X b. vision X c. type o d. level From (Check	of our A/C was attacked ion of E/A attack; sesition. Combat adding about 246 Lity good of E/A 1990 of attack; high above level well wery low
If E/A was Shot Down or Damnged:	00	MEIDERTIAL
Corroborated by Position in A/C	U'	
Other A/C firing at the same time	e?_ No	
Comments of the interrogator:	parenty .	

DECLASSIFIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,

adron		AAAT HAT OR SAW
No	Time 13136	Height
Story of the attack-	in above at 6 of	clack. I spened up with
a long continuous burst at about about 40' distant where he starte	AUU Jaras. 1 ce	urraned trivial marry was
		120
and the state of t		
		DESTROYED
-	policy is consider according to the constant of the constant o	has a company and have been seen
(Include above how E/A att. hit; howmuch he was damaged;	& how he looked	ne came, withing away.)
Our Gun Positions Firing on E/A	b. direct c. sun po Data on C a. Our he b. vision c. type o d. level From (Check	of our A/C was attacked; don of E/A attack; sition. combat adding lity of E/S high above
esitions Real Courses	in by a sure any operators of an instructive terms with	
. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged	!!	
Corroborated by Position in A/C	•	
		And the second s
Other A/C firing at the same ti		
Comments of the interrogator:	Zida 2 17 was set	ven fire several times by
1/4-and-finally west down in Dr	ink, later all t	to Great were rescued.

AUBULASSFIED FER EIECUTIVE CRIER 12356, Section 3.3.

Group 306	_ CONFIDENTI
squadron 423	Place where attached Out to See.
/C No. 666	Time 13:11 Height 10.000
I know I hit him who time he was starting assumed to lurch, ther mere and mere violen	B/A, an ME 109, came in lew and at seven e clack as ude. I picked him up when he was about 500 yards eff. In he was 300 yards away but he kept en ceming. By this te smeke. When almost directly underneath he suddenly next into a spin. I kept firing at him. He spuntly. I fellewed him dewn until he hit the water, gut saw his left wing come eff.
	DESTROYED
(Include aboys hit; howmuch ne w	how E/A attacked; how chose he came, where he was damaged; & how he looks and acted going away.)
Diagram of attack: X X X X X X X X X X ALONE Our Gun Positions Firms S/Sgt. Arthur R.	On Diagram, show a. which of our A/C was attacked; b. direction of E/A attack; c. sun position. X X X Data on Combat a. Our heading b. visibility X X C. type of E/A ME 109 d. level of attack; From high above (Check level. One) below Warn on E/A
ositions Ball turret.	
If E/A was Shot Down Corroberated by S/Set Position in A/C Waist	
Other A/C firing at th	
Comments of the inter	
f formation was very di at from standard, show ack of sheet.	ffer- Time Interrogator on

DECLASSIFIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,
By RLB MMC WAR Date 1/8/4/

Group 306	GONEILLEN				
quadron 423	Place where attacked Over	North Sea.			
/C No. 666	Time13:10 Height_	About 12,00			
THE OF STREET WE THE LETS MILES	in from 11:30 e'cleck and abe the nese gummer firing at him. to it was an easy job fellowin ter with a big splash.	. He then d			
	DESTRO	YED B.W.			

tel de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la companya del la companya de la					
hit; howmuch he was damag	ntacked; how close he came, whid; & how he looked and acted g	ere he was oing away.)			
. Diagram of attack: X X X	On Diagram, show a. which of our A/C b. direction of E/A c. sun position.				
X	X Data on Combat X a. Our heading X b. visibility good				
хх	X X c. type of E/s KE K d. level of attack; From high above (Check level	\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.			
Our Gun Positions Firing on I	/A One) below	4.75			
ames S/Sgt. Wayne J. Gray	very low				
sitions Nese gunner.	the state of the s				
. If E/A was Shot Down or Damy	ed:				
Corroborated by Position in A/C					
Other A/C firing at the same	time? Home				
Comments of the interrogator:		*************************************			
commence of the Thethograph:	A Geroaus				
	1				
If formation was very differ-	Time Int	terrogator_			

BY RIB THE MAN DATE DATE TO SECTION 3.3.

	Time_ 12:49	
firing until he was tee	darn close at which p and went ever to the r	frem seven e'cleck and abeve hundred yards away. I k peint he burst inte intense right of our plane and then Il burning intensely. At to
		DESTROYED
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	On Dia a. whi b. dir c. sun X X Data or a. Our X b. visi X X c. type d. leve Fr (Checo	ose had acted going away.) gram, show ch of our A/C was attacked; ection of E/A attack; position. n Combat heading ibility good e of E/A 7.W. 190 el of attack; rom high above x k leve! he). below very low
E/A was Shot Down or D rroborated by S/Srt. C. sition in A/C Waist our		
mer A/C firing at the same	nme time? Mone around	

DECLASSIFIED FOR ELECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,

COMBAT FORCON DENTILL

quadron 423rd	Place where attacked Between target and
/C No. 666	Time 12548 Height 21,000 ft.
Story of the attack Sher	
trigger down until he pass	cleck. I opened fire upon him and head the
though to make a spinted di	ed everhead. By this time flames were coming to, radio gumer, took him on. He turned as ive on us but suddeningly be turned as
inte a spin, burning more	ive on us but suddeningly he turned ever and i
/Tooland	
hit; howmuch ne was dame	attacked; how close he came; where he was aged; & how he looked and acted going away.)
Diagram of attack:	150x3d and acted going away.)
- TOTAL CALL	On Diagram, show
, X	a. which of our A/C was attacked;
X X X	o. direction of E/A attack: c. sun position ESTROYED
x x x x/	A-2, 1.D,VV,
x	X X Data on Combat a. Our heading
x x	A D. Wisibility Resident
그들이 사는 것 말까 않는	A C. type of E/
	d. level of attack; From high above
0	(Check level
Our Gun Positions Firing on	DOLOW Delow
S T/Sgt. B. F. Buchanan	yery low
tions Top Turret Gunher	
If E/A was Shot Down or Dama	ged:
orreberated by T/Sgt. H. I	lete \
osition in A/C Radio Oper	Paser
ther A/C firing at the same	time? Jone seen
onments of the interrogator	
1404	

UBULASSFIED FER EIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section, 3.3,

MARA Date

Group 306th			Date 21/5/43
Squadron <u>423rd</u>	Place	where	attacked Right after targ
/C No. 666	Time	12:47	Height 22,000 ft.
Story of the attack-B/A came in 600 yds. He caught fire 100 yding the nose of our A/C/ then covered with flames from nese the fuselage came off. Gunner water still burning fiercely.	dove et	raight Part	down in a spin at great s of the tail and pieces of
(Include above how E/A are hit; howmuch he was damaged	; & how	he look	ked and acted going away.)
. Diagram of attack:		On Dis	agram, show ich of our A/C was attacke rection of E/A attack; n position. cn CommatDESTROYED r heading sibility be of E/A vel of attack;
x x x x x x x	x	Data c	on CompatDESTROYED
x x	x x	b. vis c. typ d. lev	be of Every bigh above
. Our Gun Positions Firing on E/	L	(Che	From high above eck level. One) below very low
ames s/sgt. Wayne J. Grey		_	TOLY LOW MANAGEMENT AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY
ositions Nege Cunner			
. If E/A was Shot Down or Damaged	i:		
Corroborated by Lt. NeCelland Position in A/C Co-pilet			
Other A/C firing at the same ti	me? No		
Comments of the interrogator:	icoka 11	ke a ce	ertain destreyed.
If formation was very differ- ent from standard, show on	Time		Interrogator
pack of sheet.	10,000,000	Held .	Est vita established

DESTASSFIED FER EIECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section, 3.3,

dron 423	Place	where atta	icked and tax	
No.	Time	12:41	Height	22,000
floo	rtly before b	ombe were d	repped, an	B/A (ME)
was about 400 yards awa	ock and very	to every	med fire at He went int	nim and
w T had hit him so T fo	llewed him de	Ma 410	n't burst 1	DES ITAM
pilet didn't bail but	I clearly saw	him hit th	e water off	the main
man coast,				
		-	****	
			-	
(Include above how F	Manthacker.	how close	ia came: whe	re he te
hit; howmuch he was de	maged; & how	he looked	and acted go	ing away
				9
iagram of attack:		On Diagre	of our A/C w	as attac
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		b. direct	ion of E/A	ttack
x x		c. sun pe	Lition TDC	YED
X X		111111	DESINO	B.W.
x x x x	X	Data on Q	ombat	
	XX	a. Our he	ading good	The state of the s
x x	\	c. type o		09
^ ^	A A		of attack;	
		From	high above	
		(Check	level.	
our Gun Positions Firing	on E/A	(enc)	level. below	x
170	Control of the Contro		very low	
s 8/Sgt. Arthur B. Adri	144-144-144-144-144-144-144-144-144-144			
tions Ball turret.				-
If E/A was Shot Down or 1	Damnged:			
		Liferal Sci		
Corroborated by Cosition in A/C				
osition in A/C		net think		
other A/C firing at the	same time?	TOT VILLAX		
		deed duck.		
comments of the interrog	ator:			
	SZSÁW IL VIEW LÁVA		*************************************	~
A .		10.00		

DECLASSIFIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,

BY RIB MHC WARA Date 1/8/4/

MARA Date,

SUBJECT: Glaims of Plane \$666 (Mission- 21/5/43)

TO : 1-2, 1st Boat Wing


EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section

DECLASSPIED PER

- l. Attention is delied to the enclosed claims for E/A des-
- 22 This plane was in trouble and alone from the target at 12:45 until it was ditched in the North Sea at 14:20 hours. During this time it was under almost continuous attack. This fact ing this time it was under almost continuous attack. This fact and, in addition, the fact that thward the end of the running fight and, in addition, the fact that thward the end of the running fight they were so low that E/A ence hit did not have time to recover they were so low that E/A ence hit did not have time to recover they were diving into the ocean all lends credibility to the story told by the enclosed individual claims.
 - 3. This crew was rescued after spending thirty (30) hours in a dingly.

JOHN B. WRIGHT Major, AC., Group 3-2 Fife LOOK MAGAZINE 19 Per 1943

One of Our Bombers Is Missing



But the daily USAAF communiqué didn't tell the whole story

The Boeing Flying Fortress was knocked down all right—smack in the North Sea. Thirty hours later a British ship, nosing through the mist, picked up the crew, all alive.


They had set a record of 11 German fighters shot down on one mission, a world record then, and one that still stands in the European Theater—where the going is toughest.

Here's the crew: 1st Lt. Robert Smith, Lamesa, Tex.; 2nd Lts. Robert McCallum, Omaha, and Dan Barberis, North Bergen, N. J.; Staff Sgts. Aygnumd Warminski, Hamtranck, Mich., Arthur Adrian, Milwaukee, Wayne Gray, Corapolis, Pa., Clarence Durham; Chattanooga; Tech. Sgts. Bennett Buchanan, Ft. Worth, Kendrick Kate, Manchester, N. H., and Billy Lamb, Denton, Tex.

STORY BY DON WHARTON—DRAWINGS BY MAC RABOY 30TH IN LOOK'S AMERICAN HEROES SERIES



Pilot Bob Smith heads toward Wilhelmshaven with other B-17's. Ball Turret Gunner Adrian fires on an ME-109, sees him hit the water.



The formation plows past a swarm of fighters, runs into flak, reaches the target. Smith's plane bounces as Barberis releases his bombs, then bounces again—hit by antiaircraft fire.










Pilot Bob Smith heads toward Wilhelmshaven with other B-17's. Ball Turret Gunner Adrian fires on an ME-109, sees him hit the water.



2 The formation plows past a swarm of fighters, runs into flak, reaches the target. Smith's plane bounces as Barberis releases his bombs, then bounces again—hit by antiaircraft fire.



3 With two superchargers shot away, the Fortress falters. Smith and McCallum feverishly try to stay in formation.




Nose Gunner Gray opens up on a Focke-Wulf jumping in for the kill. The FW falls in flames, barely misses the Fortress.




Top Turret Gunner Buchanan pours lead into an FW passing overhead.



Now Radio Gunner Kate takes on the FW. The German turns, starts a suicide dive, but suddenly flips over into a spin, burning fiercely.




Fifteen German fighters stream for the Fort. It's out of formation, unable to catch up, down to 17,000 feet, two engines gone, a third pouring oil. But it has just begun to fight.





That makes nine fighters destroyed. But the Fort is losing more altitude, running out of ammunition. With his last round, Adrian sends one more FW flaming into the North Sea.

Tail Gunner Lamb works on two fighters, one high, one level. Fifty yards from the B-17 the two Germans collide and crash into the sea.



That's No. 11. At 1421 o'clock—one hour and 40 minutes after Arthur Adrian got the first Messerschmitt—Pilot Smith puts the Fort down on the North Sea.

The crew climbs into yellow dinghies, pushes away from the Fort, watches her go down. With a little camera they take pictures for the folks back home.

