DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, 745005

By SB/MG NARA, Date 9-9/

HEAL JARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP ...)
Office of the Intelligence Officer
United States Forces

APO 557 17 April, 1945

SUBJECT: Intelligence Narrative

Mission: Dresden, Germany

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H)

l. Narrative The 306th Group flew 39 A/C, including 4 PFF and 3 spares, as 40 "C". Assembly was as briefed. Left Chalgrove Buncher 1029, 5,000 feet; English Coast 5154N x 0115E, 1116, 5,000 feet; Ostend, 1143, 5,000 feet. On course to briefed turning point 5012N x 1211E; continued on same heading, following 40 "B" to 5023N x 1318E, 1404, 21,000 feet, but saw that 40 "B" was heading over Brux, so turned left to 5032N x 1312E, 1408, 21,000 feet. Took I.P. 5039N x 1323E, 1412 hours, 21,000 feet. There was considerable confusion in the area of the I.P. due to heavy haze and cloud and contrails plus the fact that 3rd Division A/C were in the area at the same time; other formations flew various courses which interfered with the bomb run of at least one of our squadrons. Lead made visual run and bombed at 14212, 21,000 feet. High made PFF run with visual correction. Low started PFF run, but was forced to change course twice to avoid other formations, then got into propwash which tumbled gyro. Turned off to make second run; in confusion, deputy; thinking that leader's bombs had dropped and seeing that he was still in target area, released his bombs, and 7 other A/C of squadron dropped bombs on him. When low leader found that most of his squadron had bombed the first time, he decided not to complete second run. 5 of low squadron brought bombs back. Withdrew on briefed course; left French coast 5047N x 0137E, 1740, 6,000 feet; Dungeness 1750, 6,000 feet: Base 1853.

Buckeye Black's report was not heard by group leader but was heard by other A/C in formation. Cowboy Scouter advised bombing at Reference Plus one because air to air visibility at briefed altitude was very bad; air to ground visibility 0.K. 40 "A" leader reported that he was going to bomb as advised. Near the I.P. the following breach of security was heard over VHF: "We will bomb at Reference Plus One; that's 21,000 feet." This was heard twice.

All PFF equipment functioned satisfactorily.

2. Fighter Opposition and Fighter Support

There were no E/A opposition on this Group. Shortly before I.P. Buckeye Black and Swordfish each reported jets in area. One crew observed one jet A/C in contrails below formation in target area.

P-51's appeared in strength about 1300 hours near Koblenz and gave good support to target. Weather conditions prevented close support in target area. P-47's of 56th Fighter Group near Koblenz; P-51's of 359th and 364th Fighter Groups identified. Many crews also reported white-nosed P-51's.

3. A.A. Gun Fire

At target, moderate tracking from 2 minutes before bombs away till one minute after on high squadron. Observed on another formation at Brux on way in. Damage: Lead, none; Low, 1 slight; High, 2 slight, 1 severe.

How Bombing 306th as 40 MCH attacked Dresden. Lead, on visual run, bombed target fl. Pictures show lead hits on aiming point with most of pattern obscured by previous bombing. Dense persistent contrails and haze forced high to start PFF run. Just before bombs away, bombardier made visual course correction. Pictures do not show strikes, but bombs away photo indicates hits on M/I to north of river. Low, having initiated visual run, encountered excessive propwash, tumbling gyro. Low leader discontinued run. Because of poor bisibility deputy, thinking low leader had dropped, released his bombs. 7 A/C dropped with deputy. 5 remaining A/C brought bombs back. Smoke prevents identification of low strikes. Photos from A/C 713-K, flying with 388th Bomb Group, 3rd Division, "H" in square, show that group's pattern on M/Y north of river.

- 5. Nickels

  A/C 814-G dropped ten VG-6 on #1 target, Dresden.
- 6. Weather Except for haze, clear from takeoff to vicinity of I.P., where dense persistent contrails at 20,000 feet made air to air visibility extremely poor. 10/10 cirrostratus base 22,000 feet in target area. Same on route out.
- 7. A/C In Distress
  At approximately 1421 hours, in target area, an unidentified formation came through 92nd Group on collision course in bad visibility. One B-17 from formar group collided with 2 B-17's from 92nd. One A/C blew up, one went down with wing off and third was observed going down in dive. Four chutes reported.
  - 8. A/C Returning Early
- 9. Observations
  Vessel at 5119N x 0242E, reported yesterday, still burning, with small boats standing by.
  Freiberg M/Y, SW of Dresden, full of traffic.

JOHN A. BAIRNSFATHER, Major, AC, Group S-2.

#### 17 April 1945 - DRESDEN

Because of an absence of records in National Archives, no crew interrogation reports are available for this mission. From other sources we have constructed a list of pilots flying this date, and in some cases are able to identify their aircraft.

#### 367th

Lt. Donald Kingsley

44-8197-K

Lt. Roy Hoffman

Lt. John Pinchback

Lt. John Gooch

Lt. Leonard Smith

Lt. Frederick Mitchell

Lt. Roy Marks

Lt. Shelby Scott

Lt. Joseph Hahn

#### 368th ?

Lt. James Burgess

Lt. Harold Altshuler

Lt. Herbert Cohn

Lt. Easton Effland

Lt. Wilfred Forsyth

Lt. Richard Hartshorn

Lt. Delbert McGinnis

Lt. Richard Weiser

Lt. Charles Witcomb

#### 369th

Capt. William Haase

Lt. Lester Kearney

Lt. Robert Collins

Lt. Benjamin Grumbles

Lt. Donald Hansen

Lt. John McDonald

Lt. Lowell Mikles

Lt. Clarence Fisher

Lt. Edward Sandini

Lt. Ray Schieb


Lt. Donald Snook

44-8772-0

44-8652-A

44-8724-V

- Lt. Thomas Hedley
- Lt. Donald Cheney
- Lt. Joseph Clark
- Lt. Kenyon Devaney
- Lt. Arthur Dorsey
- Lt. John Endicott
- Lt. Russell Haring
- Lt. Warren Hiney
- Lt. Francis Leigh
- Lt. Clifford Steiger



17 April 1945

Navigation Marrative - Dresden.

Commanding Officer, 506th Bomb Group (N), APO 567.

#### 40th "C" Group

- 1. Group assembly was performed on Chalgrove buncher, departing on time, on course, in Group formation. Division assembly was performed on cross-channel leg from Claston.
- Weather was clear ever England, hazy cross channel, and generally clear until 10 degrees East, with A high layer of clouds just above bomber stream. In target area, elouds, contrails, and hase restricted visibility, weather improving on return route.
- 5. Metro winds were checked by pilotage, Gee, and PFF equipment, coordinated with Air Position Indicator.
- 4. Route over England was as ordered, departing the coast on time on course, the Belgian ceast was entered six miles south of Ostend, in trail of 40th "B" Force. The briefed route was followed to 5012M 1146E, Division leader overshooting his point on turn. Group then turned into the North to avoid flak from Brux, making an IP at 5039 1323E, and bombing the primary, Dresden, visually by the lead Squadron. The high Squadron could not pick up the aiming point because of contrails and bombed by PFF equipment. The leader of the low Squadron did not drop so made a 560 degree turn and came in again. While on the run, he learned that most of his Squadron had already dropped, so turned off the target in an attempt to pick up the lead and high. The leader made one 360 degree turn around CP No. 5, 5031 1123E, picked up the high Squadron and started for base. The ordered route was followed to 5037 0830E, then getting about ten miles north of course in trail. France was departed on course and England entered as briefed, flying the ordered route to base via stand-off areas. The low Squadren could not make visual contact with the lead and high so flow about twelve miles north of the ordered route on the north edge of the bember stream to 5055 0443. Because of serious fuel shortage, lead pilot desided to return directly to base. Low squadrem departed Belgium at Ostend, entered England three miles north of Claston and came directly to base.
- 5. Target was identified and bombed visually by the lead Squadron. Target was identified and bombed PFF, by the high Squadron: Seven ships of the low Squadron dropped on a smoke marker.
- 6. Navigational aids used were: Air Position Indicator, Astro Compass, Radio Compass, Goo, and PFF Equipment.
- 7. A. Formation check points were as ordered. B. 0130 - 4 miles - 40 B C. Last in Division line. D. High Sqdn - 0850 o'clock - 200 yards until target. Low Squadron - 0480 etclock - 200 yards until target. B. None.
- Deepest Gee fix on today's mission was 5015N 1215E, 21000 feet, Mets Jamming today consisted of heavy grass. chain.
- 9. Command navigator was 1/Lt S.W. Barkwill. Group deputy was 1/Lt Flanagan. Squadrons leaders being 1/Lt A.A. Atherton, 2/Lt I.M. Baron.

JOHN D. MAC PHERSON Captain, Group Navigator.

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PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section

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8-4 Comba mission Report on Mission of 17 April 194

# S. Fuel Consymption:

AIRCRAFT NO.	TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	TOTAL GAS USED	AVERAGE PER HOU
44-6928	0.27		
43-38429	9:27 9:28	Not Serviced	- Battle Damaged
43-38802	9:28	2220 2	37
44-8772	9:11		44
44-8652	9:30	2200	231
43-38765	9:29	2170	229
42-97896	9:28	2315	244
43-38287	9:24	2465	262
43-38713	9:23	Not Serviced	- Damaged by Anoth
43-38832	9:11	2100	230
44-6819	9:22	2190	235
42-97301	9:20	2105	226
43-37600	9:18	2140	230
43-38711	9:19	1890	202
43-38914	9:03	2840	258
<del></del>	9:00	2160	
43-38916	9:03	2195	240
44-8724	0:04	2335	242
<b>43</b> -38910	9203	2090	257
42-31418	9:02	2220	230
43-37616	8:57		247
45-38376	8:49	2580	289
43-37598	8:55	2380	270
<del>4'4-8</del> 516	8:54	2190	246
43-38153	8254	2230	<b>2</b> 50
43 <del>-</del> 39116	8:53	Not Serviced-	Engine change
<b>44-</b> 6585	9 <b>#00</b>	4130	236
<del>14-</del> 8197		2330	259
43-37611	9:40	2395	248
44-6951	8:52	2210	250
<del>1</del> 3-38412	9:39	2315	240
4-6908	9:34	2580	269
4-6604	9:36	2350	246
l3 <b>~</b> 38683	9:88	2405	252
£2~97 <b>13</b> 3	9130	2390	252
3-38913	9:29	22 <b>3</b> 0	235
12-31474	9:28	2250	237
4-6814	9:07	Not Serviced⊷	Damaged in Landing
3-59028	9139	2240	S 2S
4-656 <b>3</b>	9 2 87	2270	237
	9 <b>: 84</b>	2355	246

All aircraft carried 14 X 500/G.P. Bombs excepy 44-6814 (368) which carried Nickels. All aircraft carried 2780 gallons gasoline.


ave. 10 highest 2424. galis. for 9:22-259 gal/In )elighest 2580-289-gal

. W.

	J 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0	F 1/
1.	TARGET Dresden	DATE OF LISSION: . 17. APT11. 1945.
2.	ROUTE AS FLOWN:- over.	-
3.	Meather Conditions (a) At Target Rary.	
	(b) En Route 97.947	_ 
4.	Here our A/C "Seen" or "Unseen" Turgets?	(a) At Target
		(b) En Routeseen
	Any Condensation Tralls? Danse persiste	nt above 20,000 at target area.
5.	Description of Flak at Target, including	IMMIOD OF FIRE CONTROL, if possible.
	Moderate fairly accurate from 2 minutes the high squadron. Accurate on the lead	before B.A. until l_minute after on and low.
		-
		<del>-</del> .
6:	Flak encountered or observed en route. (	In order experienced if needble
- •		
	Meagre, tracking, inaccurate at I.P. fro	m the Brux area.
7.	Was Chaff carried? Was it used as brief	ed. if not how was it used?
	Observation of crews.	
	29A/C carried58	carpet sets.
	6 A/C " spot jammin 35 A/C dispersed 12,900 un	g sets.
	35 A/C dispersed 12,900 un	its of chair.
8.	Position of Group and Combat Wing40th	. PCP
91	Details:-	

*	! A/C	<del></del> -		<del></del>				<u> </u>	<del></del>		<del></del>
	over	Demo	ged		A/C I	cost		أبدا	s of	i	
Group	E/Terr	sli	Ser	Flak	E/A	Acc	Unkn	attack	Withdrawal	T.O.T	Height
Lead	12	0	0	0	0	0	10	80	293	14213	21,000
TOM	13	<u>. 1</u>	0	0	0	0	0	50	250	1424	19,500
High	13_	2		0	0	0	0	70	330	1422	21,600
W/388	] _1	i_ 0	Q.	0	0_	, 0	<u>1_9.</u>	;"OI3	?	11,22	19,100
TOTAL	39	3	1	. 0	O	` 0	0		•	•	:

**HEADQUARTERS** LST AIR DIVISION APO 557



DOSO/V/3

25 April 1945

Report of Operations, DRESDEN, 17 April 1945.

Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, AAF Station 101. APO 634.

Data.

Bill Date of Mission - 17 April 1945.

Target Priority, Units Participating and Order of Battle:

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381st Group) · 1.
                  DRESDEN (Control M/Y) - Visual.
398th Group)
91st Group)
401st Group)
351st Group)
457th Group)
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379th Group) 1. DRESDEN (West M/Y) - Visual. 384th Group)

303rd Group) 1 192nd Group 1305th Group 306th Group) 1-5-

All Units - 2. DRESDEN (West M/Y) - H2X.

Scouting and Screening Forces.

Six P-51 aircraft furnished target weather information for 381st Group twenty minister before target time.

Five Mosquito airoraft rendezvoused with Jalat Group Leader at the L.P. discharged "chaff" to the target area in advance of the bombers.

The A total of 448 aircraft were scheduled of which 3 returned early, 428 bombed and 6 failed to return.

2. Narrative.

Assembly.

Groups and Wings assembled as briefed with little or no difficulty.

bad Flight to and from the Target.

Flight to the target was as briefed but groups were forced to fly lower than planned, due to high cloud and haze at briefed altitude. All groups bombed by aquadrons with most squadrons bombing the Priority One target assigned to them, either visually or H2X with visual assistance. Contrils, haze and clouds forced some squadrons to make as many as three runs on the target. Only two aircraft bombed in the 457th Group low squadron and the remaining aircraft returned their bombs. The 306th Group low squadron's deputy leader released when the lead aircraft closed the bomb bay doors for another run and six aircraft dropped on their release. The remaining five aircraft returned bombs to base.

[6] All groups rallied and returned as briefed with the exception of the 303rd, 92nd, 305th and 306th Groups which could not effect a rally due to the number of second and third runs which some squadrons were forced to make.

Fighter Support.

Fighter support was reported as good.

40th Group LEAD

Date 17 April 1945.

306th Bombardmont Group (H)
Formation at Assembly and Over Target

Haase G-832 G-765 Grumbles Hartshorn Hansen Kearney G-896 G-301 G-819 G-429 G-802 Schileb Weiger Collins **Effland** Snook G-600 G-287 McDonald Sandini

HOTE: A/C 713 did not assemble and joined the 588th Bomb Gp, bombing with theme

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By \_ Complete Order, Date 9-9/

Bowley (Brandt) B-0-8772-PFF

17 April 1945

B-Y-8832

B-14-8765

Kearney(Blair) B-A-8652-PFF

Hartshorn' N-L-6928

Snook B-U-7301

Collins B-Q-6819 Schieb B-X-7896

Effland . M-F-8302

Weiser N-W-8429

Milles

licDona ld

B-K-8713

B-V-8287

High

Kingsley(Gearity) M-K-8197- PFF

Mitchell M-Q-8683

Shepard Hoffman M-F-6951 14-G-7611

Cohn N-V-1474

Scott M-P-8913

11-11-7133

Pinchback 14-T-8412

Forsyth 11-0-9028

Burgess N-G-5814

(Nickels)

Smith, L.J. Gouch H-A-6604 14-J-6908

Hedley(Pope) E-U-3724\_PFF

Leigh E-M-3516

Endicott Choney E-J-1418 E-B-3910

Witcomb N-D-8711

Clark E-T-9116

Haring E-G-0153 Hiney E-X-7616 "foGinnis "-Y-8916

Altshuler N-3-8014

DeVaney E-Q-7598


Steiger E-7-8376

40th "C" Group LOW

306th Bombardment Group (H)

Formation at Assembly and Over Target

Dato 17 April 1945.



DECLASSFIED FER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3,

MISSION LOADING LIST -----

A/C Number 43-38376	A/C Numbor 44-6585	
Total Flying Time 8:50	Total Flying Time 9:00	
(P) Steiger, C. L. 2nd Lt.	(P) Dorsey, A. W.	2nd 1+
(~1,KVOGF 08 * D * K * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	(CP) Mallory, C. A.	2nd T.
(N) Haves G. W. 2nd I+	(N) Entrekein, O. L.	2nd Lt.
	(B) Rell C C	Sgt S
(E) Roth, C. A. Set	(B) Bell, C. G. (E) Anderson, O. G.	
(RO) Forgy, J. F. Sort	(RO) Hitchcock, R. H.	9/0-4
G Hay, H. F. Sgt	G) Simpson, B. J.	3/3gu .
TO THOUAR D. S. C.I	(G) Illman P P	Sgt
(4)	(G) Ulman, B. P. (G) (G)	Sgt
(G)	\c\(\c\)	
	( )	
A/C Number 42-31418 Total Flying Time 9:00	A/O N 2	
Total Flying Time 0.00	√C Number 43-39116	
3,00	Total Flying Time 8:	55
(P) Endicott. J. J. 2nd Lt.	(P) Clark J. P	2nd Lt.
$V^{\perp}/ABCODSON$ K. E. 2nd i.e.	(P) Clark, J. R. (CP) Carnicom, W. M.	2nd Lt.
\W/_Zeliniser. P. N. 2nd I+	(N) Ross W. F.	2nd Lt.
\"\KJrKBIG16. R. C. \\ S/Søt	(N) Ross, W. F.	S/Set
(E) Panchot, D. A. Sgt	(E) Fawcett, R. B. (E) Hatton, A. E.	S/Set
1"/ June W. C	(RO) MoGutre. A. G.	S/Set
Stanbus J. C. C+	G Dryden R. W.	Set
G Tanklenberg, J. Sgt	(G) Diffendaffer, C. A.	Set
(0)	(G)	
(G)	(G) (C)	
		<del></del>
A/C Number	/C Humber	
Total Flying Time	Total Flying Time	<del></del>
*	To the said and a said the said and a said and a said a	
(P)	(P)	
(CP)	(CP)	
(N)	(11)	
(B)	(B)	
(E)	(E)	
(RO)	(RO)	
(G)	(C)	مهارات مسودسان ب <u>ي مان موجود با</u> ستان الأستان.
(G)	(G)	
(C)	(G)	
(G)	\G\	
	\	
	\ /	

SQUADRON 369th MISSION N	SION LOADING LIST
A/C Number 43-38765 Total Flying Time 9:30	A/C Number 44-8652 Total Flying Time 9:30
X(P) Grumbles, B. H. 2nd. Lt. X(CP) Holve, D. G. F/O X(N) Hocker, F. C. " X(B) Gilmore, M. F. S/Sgt. X(E) B Roth, L. F. Sgt. X(RO) Melin, E. L. " X(B) Vickrow, J. G. S/Sgt. X(G) G X(G) X(G)	X(P) Kearney, L. T. lst. Lt. X(CP) Peckham, W. T. 2nd. It. X(B) Cook. D. L. " X(B) Cook. D. L. " X(B) Flanagan, W. W. " X(E) Pomykal, W. A. S/Sgt. X(RO) Thixtun, E. C. " X(G) Wiley, C. W. " X(G) Odstrcil, C. E. " X(G) FLANC, A. B. MAY
A/C Number 43-38287 Total Flying Time 9:30  X(P) McDonald, J. G. lst. Lt. X(CP) Canell, W. J. 2nd. Lt. X(N) Cochran, W. C. " X(B) Beede, V. C. Sgt. X(E) Haynes, G. Sgt. X(C) Lipkin, S. " X(G) Hennig, D. H. " X(G) Coffey, L. "	A/C Number Total Flying Time  (P) (CP) (N) (B) (E) (RO) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G)
A/C Number 44-8772 Total Flying Time 9:25	/C Number
X(P) Haase, W. J. Capt. X(CP) Bowley, A. J. "  X(N) Barkwill, J. W. 1st. Lt. X(B) Oldenburg, IA "  X(E) Miller, W. T/Sgt. X(RO) Gibson, L. N. "  X(G) Graham, R. C. S/Sgt. X(G) Graham, R. A. 2nd. Lt. X(G) Brandt, H. R. "  X(G) Olmstead, W. F. T/Sgt.	(P) (CP) (N) (B) (E) (RO) (C) (G) (G) (G)

# CIECEE

#### FRIEDRICHSTADE

- a. Nine compentrations of general purpose and incendiary bombs could be seen bursting in the target area. Complete interpretation of all of the strikes was not possible because of hase and intense smoke.
- b. The magon repair shop received at least nine direct hits and could be seen burning late in the attack.
  - c. At least five direct hits were made on the locomotive depot.
  - d. An engine roundhouse received one direct hit.
- e. Both the eastern and western choke points of this yard will be severely damaged. Rail over road bridges at both of these points received direct hits and rail lines could be seen out.
- f. The central portion of the marshalling yard received at least 220 hits. One explosion could be seen and photography taken late in the attack showed cars on fire in this area.
- g. A large road ever real bridge received two probable direct hits and many near misses.
- h. One concentration of bombs fell into a warehouse area, one half mile north of the target. Four large warehouses redeived direct hits and fires could be seen starting in the area.

#### GENERAL

- a. Three concentrations of general purpose bombs fell into the central city area. Fires were started and severe damage can be expected although most of the residential area had been damaged previously.
- b. One concentration of bombs fell into a wooded area approximately four and one-half miles northeast of the center of the city and a second concentration could be seen bursting approximately three and one-half miles southwest of the center of the city. Little damage will result.
- c. Although complete interpretation of all squadrons' bombs was impossible, from photography available it was apparent that severe damage can be expected to both of the marshalling yards.
  - 3. Difficulties Encountered.

110

- a. All groups attacked their number one priority target, DRESDEN, visually or by HZK and in squadron formations.
  - b. The 381st, 398th, 91st, 379th and 384th Groups bombed visually.
  - c. The 401st Group bombed by H2K with visual assistance.
- d. Because of extremely bad visibility, the 351st Group made an H2K approach but was able to complete the run visually.
- e. Lead squadron of 457th Group made an HZX run with visual corrections near the end of the run. Low squadron started an HZX run but the lead bombardier decided to make a second run visually. On the second run, clouds and contrails obscured the target completely and no sighting could be made due to HZX equipment failure. All bombs were returned to base with the exception of two aircraft which dropped on a smoke marker. High squadron made two unsuccessful attempts to bomb visually and then bombed by HZX on the third run.
- f. Lead equadron of 379th Group encountered rough air on the bomb run and the lead aircraft had to make a manual run. Lead aircraft of high squadron also made a manual run due to AFGE failure.

SERGRATION

- g. Lead squadron of 384th Group made an H2K approach due to extreme hase but was able to complete the run visually. Lead bombardier of high squadron had difficulty in identifying the siming point because of extreme hame.
- h. Lead squadron of 303rd Group bombed by H2X with visual assist on the third run. Hase made it impossible to pick up the aiming point on the first two runs. Low squadron hombed on the first run by H2I with visual assist near the end of the run. High squadron bombed on the third run by H2I because hase made it impossible to identify the aiming point on the first two runs.
- the 92nd Group took interval at the briefed I.P. for a visual run but cloud cover necessitated an HZK run two minutes prior to reaching bomb release line. At this point, the lead aircraft of lead squadron relinquished the lead position to deputy lead aircraft due to HZK equipment failure. A 360 degree turn was made and the target was attacked by HZK on the second run. Low squadrom bombed on the second run, using HZK, due to the position of another formation at the bomb release line on the first run. High squadron bombed by HZK on the first run.
- Low squadron was forced to make a second run due to flying a collision course with another formation on the first run. Bombing was done visually by low squadron.
- Lead squadron of 306th Group bombed visually. Low squadron started a visual run but the AFGE in lead aircraft was inoperative causing the aircraft to fly off course. At this point, the lead bombardier decided on a second run, thinking he would miss the target on the first run. The bombardier in deputy lead aircraft, seeing the bomb bey doors closing in the lead aircraft, dropped his bombs. Six aircraft in low squadron dropped on the deputy aircraft and five aircraft returned bombs to base. High squadron bombed using HZK.

Dense hase and cloud forced all groups to bomb at a lower altitude than

SECRE

ANNEX I: Bombing Tactics and Results.

1. Bomb Run Data.

	_		* 1		<u>:.</u>									
	#R(	XIP	DIRECT COP RUN	C	NOTH	AIA	TUDE	TIME OF RELEASE		flew Manual	NO OF BOMBS	RANCE DEFLIC		DROPPED ON LDR.
									DRESDEN	•				
13	<b>,81</b>	•	249	71	min	20	,900	13471	x		57×500R 83×500G		0	n
i.	83	В	17%	8	min	20	, 300	1348	x		58x500R 96x500G		.0	12
	<b>(8</b> )	O	11.0	7	min	21	,500	1349	x		1.8±500R 24±500G		0	n
. 3	98	<b>A</b>	17 <sup>0</sup> 7	11	min	21	,000	1352	x		56±50021 74±50021		0	10 .
3	98	B	<b>3</b> 0℃	11	min	20	,100	1353	X	(6	2=500g 9=500g	<b>X</b> ) ,		10
3	98	0	354°	12	min	22	200	13521	I		9x5000 2x5000		0	10
	91 91		70± 15°2	· 1: = ·	min min		,100 ,580	1353 <u>1</u> 1351	I		4x500@ 4x500@		0	n
	91	0	13%	3	min	21	,600	1355	I	( 13	2x50003 D NJOKE	• ) -	o	n
4	01	<b>A</b>	25°£ !	3	min	21	<b>,</b> 100	1358	<b>,x</b>		5x250ce 4x500M		. 0	n
4	01	В	23°r	3	min	20	100	1358	i <b>x</b>	(14	4x2500x 8x500x1	) HOT	. 0	11
4	01	O ·	99	3	min	. 21	900	<b>1400</b>			3=250 <u>02</u> 8=50 <b>01</b> 1		<b>O</b> :	11
	51		40°T		min	20	400	1402	X	7	2±10001	K13 1	0	11
3	51 51	B	38°T 43°T		min min		400	7103	X	7	2 <del>-1</del> 000y	K13 1	Ö	11
ر. ا	, <b>-</b>			1-1	BULL	-	100	7403 <u>F</u>	<b>. X</b>	′	8x10001	K13 1	0	12
4	57	<b>A</b> .	13 <sup>9</sup> 1	3	min .	21	000	Trof	x	11	8x500@	H2X	. 0	9\
4	57	B		6							2×50002		0	2
4	57	O	2491	3	min	/ 23	,000	14551	X		D NICKE 1x500CP		. 0	<b>10</b>
	79		27 T	3	min	21	000	1402		X 15	4 <b>x</b> 500RD	K 1	0	12
	79 70		23°2 25°3	2	min :	20	560	1705 1700 <del>]</del>	I.		4x500RD		0	12
او		Q					800	LAUE	:	X 13	0x500m	K 1	Ο.	10
31	34	<b>A</b>	19 <sup>9</sup> 1		min	19	200	7708	<b>X</b>	(4	3x300ce 8x250ce 4x500b1	·) 1	0	10
- 31	34.	В	20 <sup>0</sup> 1 1	4	min	<sup>/</sup> 18	600	7+08‡	x	(10	8=300@ 7=250@ 2=500%1	·) 1	0	12
3	3 <b>4</b> .	<b>C</b> .	22 <sup>0</sup> 1	1	min	20	500	π'08 <u>₹</u>	<b>X</b>	(8	1x300CP 4x250CP 2x500H1	) 1	0	12
3	03	<b>A</b>	40%	9	min	18	900	1509	<b>X</b>		6x2500x 6x500x1		. <b>o</b> .	13
3	03		3 <b>4</b> °T	10	min	20	850	1406	x	( 5	6x2500x 2x500M3 D NJOKE	7) H2X	0	13

SECRET

CEROUP	OF RUN	LENGEH COP., RUN	ALTITUDE	TIME: OF RELEASE	elew Afte	FLEW MANUAL	NO OF BOMBS	RANGE &	RANGE	DROPPED ON LDR.
				Ī	DEDECTION	-		,		
303 Q	328 <sup>9</sup> 1	9 min.	20,200	1512	X	{3	48±5001	P) H2X	0	11
92 A	59 <b>0</b>	5, min	21,400	24.33	. <b>X</b>	3	164×500E	OX H2K	0	11
92 B	30 T.	5 min	20,900	14134	X	2	206 <b>x</b> 500£	OX HOX		14
92 0	26°T	6 min	20,200	1426	. 1	3	L66x500E	DK H2K	O.	11
1. *1				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		(-	106 <del>×5</del> 001	mei		
305 A	350 <sup>9</sup> 1	10 min	21,000	1420	•	x \( \)	46x5000		0	12
		\$ 13.			•	_ {	52x500		_	
1	•	<b>1</b>			-	,	(60x500)	edic)		
305 B	7 <sup>9</sup> 2	7 <u>1</u> mn	20,750	1443	· X	ĺ	(94 <del>x</del> 5000	2P ) H2X	O <sub>i</sub>	12
(4)		1			•	(	(5 <del>2x</del> 5001	• '		
			. <b>!</b>			(	(9 <b>5=5</b> 001	edit)	•	
305 C	324°T	10 min	22,000	1420	I	(	(47 <b>x</b> 5000	P) 1	0	11
.,		1		•		(	(48 <del>±</del> 5001	MIT7)		
206 h	- Cm	90, 200	21,350	14214	x		182×5000	99· 1	0	12 \
306 A 306 B	201	90 sec	19,700	1424			112=500		ŏ	8
- •	-9-	8 min		1422	I		168×500		0	12 /
306 C	/ T	O MIN	22,000	- Mer	. •		OAD NICI			/
	!	137.57		;						


2. Targets Attacked and Results of Bombing.

#### DRESDEN

The target was a complex of two RAILROAD MARSHALLING YARDS (HAUPTBRHNHOF and PRIEDPICHSTADY YARDS) situated in DRESIEN.

#### HAUPTBAHNHOP

- a. At least fourteen accountrations of general purpose and incendiary bombs could be seen bursting in ar partially in the target area. Ground hase combined with intense amoke in the target area made it impossible to plot all of the bombs dropped.
- b. The main station received at least four direct hits from general purpose bombs.
- c. Direct hits could be seen on four large engine roundhouses. These roundhouses had been previously hit. Combined with damage from this attack, all of these installations can now be considered as destroyed or badly damaged.
- d. A road over rail bridge in the southeastern portion of the yards received at least two direct hits. Photography showed the bridge still standing with damage at the edges.
- e. In the sidings area, at least 250 direct hits could be seen on rail lines and cars in the area. Damage to this part of the yard should be severe.
- f. The casternmost choke point of the yards received at least fifty direct hits. All lines could be seen out with severe damage in an area of two rail over road bridges.
- g. At least thirty direct hits could be seen on rail lines and installations of the storage depot.
- h. Residential areas adjacent to this yard will be severely damaged from bombs which carried over the rail lines into built-up portions of the town.



17 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations Officer - Mission of 17 April 1945 - Dresden.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bomb Group (H), APO 557.

### 40th "C" Lead

#### 1. General Marrative:

- a. Lead plane of the 506th Group, flying "C" Group in the 40th Combat Wing, took off at 0950 hours to bomb a target at Dresden, Germany. Assembly was performed over Chalgrove buncher without difficulty and the ordered route flown over England, departing on time and course. The Division assembly was affected a the cross-channel leg.
- b. The route over the Continent was as ordered to 5012N 1146E, in trail of the 40th "B" Group. At this point the turn was overrun and the Group flew north of Brux to avoid flak. Message from Buckeye advised bombing a referen altitude plus one due to extremely poor air to air visibility. An IP was established and a visual run made on priority No. 1 target, Dresden, with excellent results. Bombfall is confirmed by photos as on the aiming point although smoke obscures most of the pattern. Weather in the target area was clear below 22000 feet but contrails were dense and persistent, and there was considerable haze.
- e. After bombing the lead made a 360° turn near control point five, picking up the high Squadron but not the lew. The withdrawal was uneventful and in trail of 40th "B" Group. Formation entered England at the briefed point and the lead plane landed at 1900 hours. 40th "C" Group was number 12 in the First Air Division.
- d. Friendly figh er support was excellent, with P-51's picked up near Koblenz and rendering close and continuous support throughout. No encounters by E/A were sustained by the Group, although one jet A/C was observed in centrails below the formation. Flak was moderate and inaccurate.

# 2. Aircraft Not Attacking:

a. The lead Squadron was made up of 13 A/C, including two H2K planes and a flying spare. One A/C: failed to assemble and flew with 588th Group, third Division. The spare filled in for this plane. All 18 A/C made effective serties against the priority No. 1 target at Dresden, Germany with excellent results.

#### 5. Lost Aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

# 40th "C" Low

# 1. General Marrative:

a. Reference is made to narrative of the lead Squadron with the following additions:

(1) Low Squadron began an HZX rum on the target in conditions of

very peer visibility. Due to interference twice on the run by other formations in the congested target area, and due to picking the target up visually just a little teo late to bomb, the leader decided to make a second run. At the same time the deputy leader was hit by prop wash and in the confusion of poor visibility, and in regaining control of the plane, he saw leader's bomb bay doors beginning to close. Thinking it was bombs away, he dropped and 7 others toggled on his markers. As the leader began the second run, upon learning there were only five A/C with bomb loads he abandoned the run.

- (2) Low leader could not locate the lead and high Squadrons to affect a rally so returned alone flying along the edge of the bomber stream. Due to shortage of fuel the stand-off route over England was not flown and the Squadron returned to base direct from the English coast.
  - (3) Lead plane took off at 0943 hours and landed at 1847.

#### 2. Aircraft Not Attacking:

a. The low Squadron was made up of 13 A/C, including an H2X plane and a flying spare which completed the mission. As narrated above, 8 A/C released erroneously and five returned bombs to base on decision of the lead pilot. Thus 13 A/C sortied, 13 were credit sorties, and 8 were effective sorties on No. 1 target, Dresden.

#### 3. Lost Aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

## 40th "C" High

# 1. General Narrative:

a. Reference is made to narrative of the lead Squadron with the following additions:

- (1) High Squadron made an H2X run with visual correction at last moment on No. 1 target. Results were unobserved.
- (2) After bombing the high rallied with the lead near control point five, and returned with them.
- (3) Flak over the target was moderate and fairly accurate on the high Squadron.
  - (4) Lead plane took off at 0937 hours and landed at 1917.

# 2. Aircraft Not Attacking:

a. The high Squadron was made up of 13 A/C including an H2X plane and a flying spare which completed the mission. All planes attacked the No. 1 target on H2X with results unobserved.

#### SECRET

# HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Communications Officer APO 557

J-A-1

18 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Communications Report for the Mission of 17 April 1945.

- TO: Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H), APO 557, U.S. Army.
- 1. Thirty-nine (39) navigators reported using one or more of the Bunchers at A-63, B-75 and Chalgrove for L.O.P.'s and homing.
- 3. Thirty-nine (39) aircraft were equipped with "Gee" and the navigators reported fixes to 50 15N 12 15E.
- 4. The VHF was used for control of the formations. Reception was reported as being very, good. Traffic was moderate. Five (5) control points and a bombstrike were transmitted as briefed. The group leader reported he was unable to reach either Colgate or Cycle Relay on control point number five.
- 5. 423rd (F) received one (1) QDM from the base HF/DF station. No bearings were obtained from the base VHF/DF station.
- 6. The group commander reported an aircraft gave reference altitude in the clear. He stated he thought it was part of a conversation with "Buckeye Black". Call sign of offender not known.
- 7. a. The group lead operator (TWCO) transmitted the bombstrike and six (6) progress reports as briefed. Receipts were obtained for all transmissions.
- b. Thirty-five(35) aircraft were equipped with "Carpet" and the radio operators reported that the equipment functioned properly the entired route.
- c. Thirty-five (35) aircraft dispersed 12,900 units of "Ghaff" at the briefed time and place on orders of the Group Commander.
- d. Four (4) aircraft were equipped with H2X. The operators reported the equipment as functioning perfectly the entire route.
  - 8. The following Communications Malfunctions were reported:

    368th Squadron 814 Navigator's mike switch broken. Repaired and

checked.

Down De Forter

ELECUTIVE CREEK 12356, Section 3.3 NARA, Date DECLASSFIED FER

40th "C" Group

DATE: 17 April 1945.

GROUP 306th

## BOIBING ACCOUNTABILITY

FCRM

				-
1.	Total Bombs Carried	LEAD SQUADRON 182×50014-43GP + 4 smoke	LCVI SQUADRON 182x500M-43GP + 2 smoke	UIGH SQUADRON 168x500M-43GP + 2 smoke + 10 nicke
2.	Total Bombs on Primary	168x500M-43CP + 4 smoke	112x500M-43GP + 1 smoke	168x500M-43GP + 2 smoke + 10 nicke
3.	Total Rombs on Secondary	None	None	None
4.	Total Bombs on Last Resort	None	None	None
5.	Total Bombs on T.O.'s	14×50014-43@	None	None
6.	Total Bombs Returned from PE A/C	None	None	None
7.	Total Bombs Jettisoned from RE A/C	None	None	None
8.	Total Rombs Pet'd from A/C over Target	None	70x500M-43GP + 1 smoke	None
9.	Total Bombs Jettisoned from A/C over Target	None	None	None
10.	Total Rombs Unaccounted for due to Lost A/C	None	None	None

Explanation: No. 8, A/Cs 724,418,616, and 585 did not drop because the lead aircraft didn't drop. No. 5, A/C 713 bombed with 388th Bomb Group (3rd Div.).

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, 745005

NARA, Date 9-91

# HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDAENT GROUP (H) Office of the Group Bombardier APO 557

17 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Bombing Narrative Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H), APO 557.

# 40th "C" Lead & High

1. The 306th Bomb Group furnished 13 A/C to fly lead and 13 A/C to fly high squadrons of the 40th "C" Group. The turn off the I.P. was as briefed. Dense contrails and ground haze hindered sighting operations and a PFF run was begun on the assigned target. The lead squadron's bombardier picked up the assigned target and started a visual run after only a few minutes down the bomb run. The high squadron's bombardier was unable to pick up the assigned target until the last few seconds of bombardier was unable to make a few course corrections just before the bomb release point. Flak was meager and inaccurate. The runs were all made with A.F.C.E. A/C 713 bombed with the 388th Bomb Group.

- 2. All A/C bombed.
- 3. Bombing results were:a. Lead Excellent.b. High Unobserved.
- 4. Complete Combat Bombing Flight Records enclosed.
- 5. Bombing accountability Report, by number and type enclosed.
- 6. A.F.C.E. was O.K.
- 7. Type of release.
  a. 20 A/C salvoed, 6 A/C in train.

## 40th "C" Low

Group. The Jo6th Bomb Group furnished 13 A/C to fly low squadron of the 40th "C" Group. The I.P. turn off was as briefed. Flak was meager and inaccurate. The low squadron's bombardier started a FFF run ant picked up the target a few minutes down the bomb run and began a visual run. The A.F.C.E. was not in working order and die not respond to the bombardiers corrections and therefore put him off course. After not respond to the bombardiers corrections and therefore put him off course. After his was noted a manual run was made but by this time the target was too near and the lead bombardier decided to make a 360° when he saw that he would miss. During this time the formation was scattered due to the A.F.C.E. trouble in the lead A/C and dense contrails and there were times when the lead plane could not be seen by some of the wing planes. The deputy A/C was for a moment out of control and almost collided with the lead A/C when resuming it's position in the formation noticed that the lead with the lead A/C when resuming it's position in the formation noticed that the lead bombs, dropped his. Six other A/C that could not see the lead A/C very well dropped bombs, dropped his. Six other A/C that could not see the lead A/C very well dropped bombs. A/Cs 724, 418, 616, 516 and 585 returned their bombs. All other A/C dropped

- 2. Eight A/C of the squadron bombed.
- 3. Results were poor.
- 4. Bombing accountability Report, by number and type enclosed.
- 5. A.F.C.E. was inoperative.
- 6. Type of release. a. 8 A/C salvoed.

DONALD R. ROSS, Captain, AC, Group Bombardier. 40th Group HIGH

306th Bombardment Group (H)
Formation at Assembly and Over Target

Dato 17 April 1945.

G-FFF 197 Kingsley Korhegay G-474 G-951 Mitchell Hoffman Shepard 0-412 G-133 G-918 Burgess Scott Marks, R 0-565 G-908 Smith, LJ Goodh Hahm